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Chapter One: “The Looming Threat”

From the spring of 1776 to the summer of 1777, there was a looming threat to the
northern region of the colony of New York bordering Canada. Across the border, British forces
were marshaling for an invasion. Finally, in June of 1777, the inevitable came true; British
General John Burgoyne moved south from St. John’s toward Lake Champlain in upstate New
York with an army numbering approximately 9,500. This diverse force consisted of British army
regulars, hired German troops, Indian allies, Canadian volunteers and loyalists, and a glut of
camp followers, who helped support Burgoyne’s army. His aim was to move south to the city of
Albany to link up with two other British armies approaching from the west and the south. These
advances were intended to gain British tactical control over the Hudson River Valley, thereby
separating the New England colonies (which the British saw as the spark of the rebellion) from
the rest of the American colonies. The plan was known as “The Grand Strategy”, and it had been
approved by the British High Command towards the end of the previous year as the overriding
strategy for the 1777 campaign season. The “Grand Strategy”, however, was flawed from its
inception. Resistance to the British advances by Patriot forces and militias, aided by local
communities, was completely underestimated by the British. This flaw was exacerbated by the
forbidding terrain of upstate New York, as well as a complete failure of coordination between
Burgoyne’s advance from the north, Colonel Barry St. Leger’s advance from the west, and
General William Howe’s forces positioned to the south in New York City.
The Patriot defense against any potential British invasion force from Canada was
manifest in the Northern Department of the Continental Army, which held the direct
responsibility for the protection of the New York colony; namely Lake Champlain, Lake George,
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and the Hudson River Valley north of the Hudson Highlands. In command of the Northern
Department was Major General Philip Schuyler, a man born from an affluent Dutch patrician
family in Albany. Schuyler was a veteran of the French and Indian War, having served with the
British Army. Towards the end of that war, he was sent on military assignment to England,
where he studied logistics; an aptitude that would serve him well during and following his
command of the Northern Department. Politically connected, he was a member of the New York
colonial assembly, and was sent as a delegate in 1775 to the Second Continental Congress in
Philadelphia. After the Continental Congress had named George Washington as commander-inchief of the Continental Army, Schuyler assisted Washington in “formulating regulations”1 for
the army. Seemingly due to his personal friendship with Washington, and his “consequence in
the Province (of New York)”2 Schuyler was promoted to Major-General and placed in command
of the Northern Department’s Army, with the express commission to “repel every hostile
invasion of American liberty and to defend it from assault”.3 Fortunately for Schuyler, his
previous experience in logistics would prove to come in handy, as he immediately set to the task
of collecting additional soldiers, supplies and ammunition for the northern defense. On July 9,
1775, Schuyler assumed his command at Albany, which was to serve as his headquarters.
Schuyler immediately went to work preparing an invasion of Canada authorized by the
Continental Congress. At the end of 1775, after seizing Montreal, a small American force led by
Generals Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold attempted to take Quebec from British
hands but were repulsed by British forces under the command of the Royal Governor of Canada,
Guy Carleton. General Schuyler fell ill just before the battle and handed command of the attack
1
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over to General Montgomery. Tragically, Montgomery “fell before Quebec while the general
(Schuyler), too ill to remain in the field, labored from his sickbed to keep his army together and
properly supplied”4. General Arnold, now in command, decided to continue the siege of
Carlton’s forces, yet was never fully able to regain offensive capabilities. By May of 1776, with
sickness running through the ranks, the Americans withdrew to Fort Ticonderoga.
Ominously, in Quebec, over the course of the same month of May 1776, “almost nine
thousand British troops arrived under General Burgoyne, who became Carleton’s second-incommand, and four thousand German mercenaries, mostly from Brunswick, under the command
of Major General Friedrich Adolf Riedesel.”5 Along with these reinforcements, Carleton
received orders from Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, “to
expel the Americans from Canada and then conduct an offensive up Lake Champlain, the goal
being to link up with General Howe’s army in New York.”6 After checking an American naval
probe under General Benedict Arnold at The Battle of Valcour Island in October of 1776 and
gaining control of Champlain, Carleton decided not to press his advantage toward Ticonderoga
due to the lateness of the campaign season, and instead opted to wait for the spring. Carleton had
seemingly accomplished the primary goal of Germain’s directive by expelling the Americans
from Canada but had yet to begin an offensive beyond Lake Champlain.
As the new year of 1777 dawned, the British government in London weighed its options.
For his part, General Burgoyne continued to analyze an in-depth three-pronged strategy to sever
New England from the rest of the thirteen North American colonies by seizure of the Hudson
River. In a letter to Lord Germain, Burgoyne delved into the minutiae of the logistics needed to
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conduct such an operation from Canada. Burgoyne supposed that an expeditionary force from
Canada “ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank, and file. The artillery
required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thousand
Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.”7
From the beginning, Burgoyne envisioned supplementing British forces with local allies, such as
Canadians, Loyalists, and Native American warriors who sided with the British. Regarding local
opposition, Burgoyne doubted that the Americans could muster a strong enough force to oppose
the British advance from Canada, and he argued that in light of the recent successes of the British
in New York, the time of year, and the strategic situation in the Connecticut River valley, that “it
is not to be imagined that any detachment of such forces as that of Schuyler can be supplied by
the enemy”.8 With this statement, Burgoyne perhaps underestimated the enemy commander
opposing him; but he most certainly underestimated the defensive potential of the enemy forces
at the time under the command of General Schuyler.
Burgoyne’s main target was the city of Albany, New York. In 1775, Schuyler utilized the
city of Albany as his staging depot for his invasion of Canada. With the failure of that invasion,
the populace of Albany realized that Schuyler’s culling of resources, and the invasion itself had
“placed a wintertime strain on Albany resources, revealed that many (Albany) county people did
not support such aggressive measures, and assured that the British would seek revenge in the
months to come”.9 The failure of the American expedition into Canada had also produced an
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unforeseen outcome: a number of refugees from Canada of French ancestry that supported the
American cause had fled south to the Albany region.
In Burgoyne’s plan, he had suspected that locals would flock to his banner, seeing
himself as a liberator to the oppression loyalists to the Crown felt. The British parliament shared
this sentiment. Yet, Albany County was a hotbed of revolutionary furor. Albany itself stood at
the crossroads of trade between the port of New York City and Canada. Since its founding, the
city had served as a market between these two areas, with local merchants exploiting the natural
resources of the Adirondacks and the river valleys of both the Hudson and the Mohawk rivers. In
early 1775, to protect these interests, a “‘Committee of Correspondence, Safety, and Protection’,
which contained people from additional settlements beyond Albany, met publicly at an Albany
tavern and agreed to send representatives to a Provincial Congress and to encourage the districts
to form their own action committees.”10 Nearby Schenectady did, and these committees began
acting as a sort of shadow government as the local royal governments were in disarray. They also
sought to “identify potential enemies of liberty, and to support the formation of a new militia”.11
It seems in Albany there was a sense of camaraderie in the majority with the plight of the
inhabitants of Boston. Author T.H. Breen mentions how local committees throughout the
colonies collected funds in support of the revolutionary cause. When funds weren’t forthcoming,
the Albany Committee “complained that some of the outlying districts had been tardy in
rendering accounts of donations”12. While it was stressed that the donations of these funds were
voluntary, they were also public record, thereby revealing to the Committee who supported and
who did not send support. Committees just like Albany’s had been forming throughout the
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colonies, particularly after the First Continental Congress called for a general boycott of trade
with Great Britain. Breen goes on to argue that the Committees served to keep the revolutionary
spirit focused, and how even before the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and Concord in 1775,
“huge numbers of Americans had already participated in the establishment of a massive
committee system, putting into place the vital infrastructure of resistance and extending support
for the cause far beyond the boundaries of New England.”13 These Committees implied violence
to those who did not conform, and when hostilities finally erupted, many of those loyal to the
Crown fled, either to Canada, Britain, or south towards New York City. Those that did not were
under constant surveillance. From 1775, the Albany Committee gained more oversight and
control over both civil and military affairs in the county. Recognizing the county’s inherently
dangerous geographical placement, the Albany Committee continued to encourage the creation
of militias for the defense of the county, seeking all men of military age that could not be spared
for professions deemed necessary to the revolutionary effort. By 1777, these militias were being
utilized to root out loyalist sympathizers, for when “apprehending Tories required more force
than a sheriff could provide, committeemen relied on militias to make arrests. Most of the time,
these units followed committee instructions since the boards paid-and formed-them.”14
By 1777, Albany County had become a terror state for those that supported the Crown.
Some had fled earlier, such as John Freeman and his son Thomas, who had initially left Albany
to work a farm about 30 miles to the north, but with the increasing radicalization of the area fled
to Canada in late 1775, abandoning their farm. Perhaps driving their flight was an oath of loyalty
expected from the citizens of Albany by the committee who felt, following the outbreak of
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hostilities in Lexington and Concord of that year, that it had become “indispensably necessary
that the sense of the Citizens should be taken on the line of Conduct they propose to hold at this
Critical Juncture.”15 Those that did not outwardly profess loyalty to the patriot cause became
known as “disaffected”, and the militias of the various districts of Albany County, created by the
committees for the common defense, were being utilized to apprehend and incarcerate those with
loyalist tendencies. The feeling on the streets was one of paranoia, and many loyalist
sympathizers were outed to the committees by their friends and neighbors. This was not just
happening in Albany, but other towns as well. In Schenectady, a town to the north of Albany on
the Mohawk River, being accused of disloyalty to the patriot cause could lead to a threat of
violence. On May 3, 1777, one man, Jacob Truax, was accused by the Schenectady Committee
of being a Tory and threatened with imprisonment, “but Shew a tomehaak he had fixt rady &
Saith that who Ever Came to take him he would kill him.”16 The very same day, another man,
Alexander Campble, swore his loyalty to the cause in front of the committee, stating that “if the
County of Albany is Envaided by any enime whatsoever he would take up arms in defense
thereof and that he would pay his Evedant in Suport of this Contry.” As we can see, there had
always been the threat of a British invasion from the north in New York, especially after the fall
of Fort Ticonderoga to Patriot forces in 1775, and by May of 1777 it seemed imminent to the
people of Albany County.
Local militias were ordered to be raised in many of the towns of Albany County. During
the revolution, the principal towns of Albany County were “Albany, Schenectady, Claverack
(now Hudson), Coxsackie, Kinderhook, Schaghticoke, Canaan, Cambridge, Half Moon and
15
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Saratoga (now Schuylerville).”17 And it wasn’t just Albany County. Militias were also raised in
the other counties of New York, including Dutchess, Ulster and Tryon counties, as well as in the
surrounding colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire. Generally, all males
between the ages of 15 and 55 were eligible for militia service to defend their towns. Most of the
towns of Albany were able to easily fill their muster quotas for the committee, yet according to
authors Tiedmann and Fingerhut “the old farming village of Kinderhook stood out in its
reluctance to support the American cause…and could not be counted on to fill militia or supply
quotas or to suppress internal enemies.”18 Throughout the war, Kinderhook was known as a Tory
haven, with its isolated geography. In contrast, the King’s District (Canaan) to the east of
Kinderhook, “could count on ‘a thousand men’ under arms…and on its leaders to lend support
and suppress Tories”.19 With the threat of a potential invasion from the north, some ranger
companies were organized from selected members of the local militias. Ranger companies
tended to utilize specialized tactics such as deep woods fighting techniques and were much more
mobile than traditional militia units. Some Ranger units were stationed in particularly vulnerable
locations like Ballstown, Coxsackie and Schoharie. All these units stood ready to repel a
potential invasion in their own districts, and to march to the general defense of others. Yet, the
primary line of defense was considered by most to be Fort Ticonderoga, an installation on a
small peninsula between Lake George and Lake Champlain, which guarded the upper reaches of
the Hudson River.
Militia units under Ethan Allan and Benedict Arnold had taken Fort Ticonderoga from
the British in 1775, yet the fort needed refortification. During the Siege of Boston, General
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George Washington had dispatched Col. Henry Knox to take the cannon from Ticonderoga and
bring them to Boston, a distance of over 300 miles, a mission that Knox had accomplished in just
one months’ time. Ticonderoga had been utilized by Schuyler as the staging point for the failed
invasion attempt of Canada yet he had withdrawn his forces back to Ticonderoga in May of
1776. The fort, at this point, seemed to be in a sad state of repair. General Horatio Gates, in
command of the Canadian Department, remarked that “the ramparts are tumbled down, the
casemates are fallen in, the barracks burnt, and the whole a perfect ruin, that it would take five
times the men of our army, for several summers, to put it in defensible repair.”20 Gates had
arrived at Ticonderoga to take command of the Canadian Department forces, yet by the time of
his arrival, all of the patriot forces in Canada were now in New York, which fell under the
Northern Department, and thus those forces fell under Schuyler’s command. This raised the issue
of command between the two generals, and they appealed to the Continental Congress to clarify
the situation. After first attempting to give the two generals joint command, Congress eventually
decided to leave Schuyler in command and recall Gates to Washington’s army in New Jersey.
This situation served as the beginning of a feud between Gates and Schuyler that would come
back into play.
With the issue of command settled for the time being, repair work began on Ticonderoga.
While Schuyler was in command of the Northern Department in general, direct command of
Ticonderoga lay with Brigadier General Anthony Wayne. Wayne had previously served with the
Northern Army during the invasion of Canada, and his initial assessment of the garrison at
Ticonderoga seemed dire, reporting that “our whole force…don’t amount to 1900 men, one
fourth of whom are destitute of arms”, but, determined to hold the post, continued that “in case
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of an attack…this place will not be carried without the expense of much blood.”21 The
Continental Congress, seeking a strong commander for the fort, ordered Major-General Arthur
St. Clair from the main Continental Army to take over command from Wayne. Dispatched to
assist St. Clair and the garrison at Ticonderoga was Lt. Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, an engineer
who had fought at the Battle of Bunker Hill the previous year. Baldwin saw that across the lake
from Ticonderoga was a hill that was much better positioned to cover ships approaching from the
north than the fort itself. He ordered the construction of a set of batteries and defenses at the top
of this hill, dubbing it Mount Independence. Along with this construction, new boats and docks
were built, along with “two additional guardhouses, a campsite, and a large storehouse with a
bakery and a hospital”.22 To facilitate construction and supply of the new fortifications on Mount
Independence, a floating bridge was constructed across the lake, which consisted of floating logs
linked together by chains on either side that were anchored to either shore. Another hill stood to
the southwest of Ticonderoga which was even higher than Mount Independence. Mount
Defiance, standing at over 850 feet tall, overlooked both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence,
but apparently both St. Clair and Baldwin considered Mount Defiance insurmountable by any
cannon, and decided not to fortify the height. Others disagreed, such as Lt. Colonel John
Trumbull, a Harvard graduate, who felt that a fort on Mount Defiance could “not only cover the
lake and Fort Ticonderoga proper, but it’s location made it an ideal site to receive troops,
equipment, and supplies arriving from southern New York and New England via a road that ran
near the hill”.23 Another engineer, Colonel Thaddeus Kosciuszko, also felt this way, yet despite
these very logical observances, Trumbull and Kosciuszko’s advice was not taken and Mount
Defiance remained un-fortified by the patriots. By the end of June 1777, Fort Ticonderoga, under
21
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the direct command of General St. Clair, “saw an American force of about twenty-five hundred
men attempting to hold works on two sides of the lake which required at least four times that
many.”24 The primary line of defense for the Northern Department was not ready.
In looking at overall patriot troop strength at the beginning of the Saratoga Campaign,
author Richard M. Ketchum, citing a later return from General St. Clair himself, places the
garrison strength at Ticonderoga at “2089 rank and file fit for duty, plus the corps of artillery,
124 unarmed artificers, and about 900 militia”.25 Author Borden H. Mills, in his excellent militia
analysis of Albany County, states that the various districts of the county were able furbish a
combined total of “4783”26 From these two sources alone, we can get a rough estimate of about
7800 patriot troops in the Northern Department opposing a potential invasion from Canada in the
first half of 1777. Yet, also according to Mills, in the return furnished by Major General Gates to
General Burgoyne in mid-October, “the American army consisted of thirteen brigades, in
addition to artillerists and cavalry, and mustered 22,348 officers and men.” 27 This shows an
overall increase in troop strength of patriot forces by over 14,500 from June through October
1777. How and why did the patriot force numbers increase so dramatically during that time
period?
Meanwhile, in Canada, the British invasion force was completing assembly. As early as
1775, the British had concluded that the key to ending the rebellion lay in separating the New
England colonies from the rest. The royal governor of Canada, Guy Carleton, had received
orders to attempt to link up with General William Howe’s forces in the south, yet as previously
mentioned declined to press his advance up Lake Champlain in late 1776. In November of 1776,
24
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General Howe, in New York, wrote two letters to Lord Germain in London. The first detailed the
British victories in and around New York, and the fact that the main body of Washington’s
Continental Army had moved into New Jersey, while the second letter mentioned that Howe
would be moving a large portion of his troops to New Jersey for the winter. A third letter from
Howe to Germain in late December opined that he felt the Americans in the New York and New
Jersey did not pose much of a threat, and that he “no longer regarded New York and New
England as the key to victory; rather, he was now convinced that the key to victory lay in
capturing Philadelphia, the capital of the newly-established American nation.”28 On Christmas
Day, however, Washington’s forces in New Jersey launched a surprise attack on the Hessian
garrison at Trenton, New Jersey, prompting Howe to send a fourth letter to Germain stating that
he was “now convinced that Washington was a greater threat than previously envisioned.
Therefore, in order to suppress the patriot revolution, it was vital to not only seize Philadelphia
but, just as importantly to destroy Washington’s Army.”29 As we can see, by late 1776, General
Howe in New York City did not necessarily see that an advance by his army up the Hudson was
a primary objective. If anything, it seems that he felt he would advance up the Hudson only after
seizure of Philadelphia, and only then if needed.
Burgoyne, during this time, was back in England, having left Quebec in October of 1776
to deal with the death of his wife while he was away in North America. Yet, Burgoyne also used
his trip for personal advancement. While in England, he supplied his “Thoughts for Conducting
the War from the Side of Canada” to Lord Germain, and through him, to King George III.
Burgoyne was in England to obviously jockey for command of the proposed expedition from
Canada, and, due to Germain’s dislike of Carleton, won the command. Germain had felt that
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Carleton did not have the drive to succeed in an operation toward the Hudson, and this feeling in
Germain was exacerbated by Burgoyne, who was “making it unmistakably clear that Carleton
had botched last summer’s campaign when he had Ticonderoga all but in his grasp and turned
around and headed for Canada.”30 Germain had a long-standing dislike and distrust of Carleton,
dating back to both of their participation in the Seven Years War, and was actively looking to
prevent Carleton from commanding the expeditionary force. In Burgoyne, Germain found a man
who “possessed many of the attributes Lord George found lacking in the man presently in charge
in Canada - above all, fire in the belly.”31 King George III, however, was aware of Germain’s ill
feelings toward Carleton, but did not want to replace him. Instead, the king wanted to leave
Carleton in charge in Canada with a small force for defense, agreeing that the previous campaign
commanded by Carleton left much to be desired, stating that “Burgoyne may command the corps
to be sent from Canada to Albany”32 With this, Burgoyne prepared to leave for Canada to
assume his new command. He left for Plymouth on March 27, 1777, to return to Quebec.
Carleton in the meantime, not aware of the machinations in London, had been preparing
for the spring return up the lake. According to Ketchum, “when he withdrew to Quebec he left a
crew of artificers behind at St. John’s, where they stayed building ships, floating batteries, gun
boats & two ships of 20 guns each”.33 But not much else could be done during the Canadian
winter. A lieutenant of the 53rd Regiment of British Grenadiers, William Digby, had
accompanied Carleton’s force during their withdrawal back to Canada, and his battalion wintered
at Verchere, about twenty-three miles below Montreal. Digby mentions how quickly the
waterways in the area froze during the winter, and how every morning the ice needed to be
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broken up around the keels of their docked boats to prevent damage. He also describes how “all
kinds of provisions are laid up in that frozen state, during the winter, and when wanted to be
used, are gently thawed in cold water for some time and then cooked, when they eat perhaps
after being months killed.”34 He also mentions that when members of his company died during
the winter months, attempting to bury them was futile, as the ground could be frozen to six feet.
He describes how the Canadian’s stored their dead in a small hut until the winter thaw when they
could be buried. As Digby describes the harshness of the environment, he alludes to “balls, &
assemblies at Quebec and Montreal; the former is the seat of the Governor, who lives in a great
degree of elegance, and as absolute in his government as possible. Gen Carleton, notwithstanding
his severity, was much liked by the Canadians, perhaps fear might have something to say in that
case”.35 Digby does not necessarily appear to be a fan of Carleton, noting how he spent most of
the winter in Quebec and Montreal, whereas General Phillips remained at Montreal while
General Riedesel, “of the foreign troops”36 was stationed at Trois Riviere.
The “foreign troops” that Digby refers to were the four thousand German soldiers that
had arrived with Burgoyne in May of 1776. These Germans were not quite mercenaries as
popularly believed but were auxiliaries hired by the British Crown. For many years, the states
and principalities of the area now known as Germany (which did not unify as a country until
1871) hired their military units out for profit. With the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and
Concord in 1775, the British government realized the need for a large land army to quell the
rebellion, yet much of their regular land forces were already stretched thin in other theaters.
According to Ketchum, “recruiting was going very slowly; indeed, and it would take time—too
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much time, in the king’s opinion—to raise new units at home. So, the decision was made to hire
foreign troops, as the crown had done recently during the Seven Years War.”37 The British hiring
of foreign troops only exacerbated the anger among the colonists toward the crown. The majority
of German troops in Canada hailed from Braunschweig in Germany, yet a substantial portion
were from Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Hanau, and as “Landgrave Friedrich II of Hesse-Cassel was
the first German sovereign to provide troops to the British…it was natural for the Americans to
apply the generic term ‘Hessian’ to all the German soldiers.”38 The subjects of these German
principalities were often forced into military duty by their rulers, who, in effect, lent them to
other countries to fight for profit. The British contracts for these soldiers, who were already
highly trained and fought as their own units under their own flags, quickly and efficiently solved
the manpower problem for the British.
While the use of German soldiers by the British incensed the Americans, British intended
use of Indians was meant to terrify them. In assessing Burgoyne’s “Thoughts for Conducting the
War from the side of Canada”, King George III noted that he felt “Indians must be employed and
would have to be tightly controlled”.39 Burgoyne sought to use Indians as scouts, and as a screen
for his army as he marched south. At the outset of hostilities, the six nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy had pledged neutrality in any conflict between the British and Americans, yet in
November of 1775 a Mohawk warrior named Joseph Brant traveled to England to address land
grievances the Mohawk had with American colonists. While in England, Brant sought out “those
Englishmen who were favorable to the American cause and listened to their reasoning. As a
result of his inquiries, he became convinced that the Americans’ sole objective in the war was to
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become masters of the continent.”40 Upon his return to North America, Brant went about trying
to convince the rest of the nations of the Iroquois Confederacy to side with the British, and “had
been favorably received wherever he went. Only the Oneidas and Tuscarora’s remained
unvisited.”41 Thus, despite the best efforts of Gen. Philip Schuyler and the Americans to secure
loyalty; or at the very least neutrality, from the Iroquois, only the Oneida and Tuscarora sided
with the Americans. The Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Mohawk all sided with the British,
essentially creating a civil war within the Confederacy. To Burgoyne, however, this was
irrelevant. His intended use of the Indians, as scouts in a wilderness they knew so well, and
perhaps as a weapon of terror, would prove to be extraordinarily beneficial. Yet, the British way
of making war and the Indian way of making war were markedly different. Ketchum states that
“a certain code of honor existed among Europe’s armies, and while war was war, that code did
not include butchering opponents after they had been taken captive.”42 Nonetheless, Carleton, in
Burgoyne’s absence, oversaw gathering Indian allies. Burgoyne expected about 1,000 to join him
for his campaign.
Another contingent that Burgoyne expected to join him were Canadian volunteers.
Preparing a large land army for an invasion requires many logistical aspects beyond combat
capabilities. Volunteers would be needed to “not only arrange for supplies—food, clothing,
ammunition, accruements, and fodder for animals—but the transportation of said provisions.”43
Also, help would be needed for maintenance of equipment, and last but certainly not least,
medical support. While Burgoyne was in England, Carleton had attempted to recruit Canadian
volunteers, of which Burgoyne expected 2,000, yet was able to form “only three companies of
40
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one hundred Canadians each”.44 The Canadian volunteers were “ordered to transport the army’s
provisions, ammunition, and baggage”.45 Unsurprisingly, many of the Canadian volunteers
deserted before the final force was even assembled.
Burgoyne, as mentioned previously, also expected that loyalists would join his
expedition. Many of the loyalists in Canada had fled from the American colonies in rebellion for
fear of retribution for their loyalty to the crown. One such loyalist, John Peters, had been a local
magistrate in the New Hampshire Grants, and had been selected as a delegate to the First
Continental Congress, yet upon attending realized that Congress was striving toward
independence, and left. On his way home he was beaten repeatedly, and eventually fled to
Canada. When his property in the Grants was confiscated and his wife and family were put out of
their home in retribution, he sought revenge by joining Carleton’s army, eventually signing on to
join Burgoyne for his expedition. Yet, many loyalist volunteers to the British Army were looked
down upon, “one reason being the regulars’ disdain for people they considered provincials, plus
the fact that too many loyalists had delusions of grandeur and considered themselves entitled to
be officers.”46 Regardless, not many Canadian loyalists signed up to join from the outset, but this
would not worry Burgoyne, as he was promised that loyalists would flock to his army during his
march south toward Albany.
On May 6, 1777, Burgoyne arrived back in Quebec. With him were two letters written by
Lord Germain to Carleton at the end of March, to be hand-delivered to Carleton by Burgoyne
himself upon arrival in Canada. The first letter expressly directed that Indians were to be used on
the upcoming expedition. The second letter had a much more direct effect on Carleton. He was
relieved of military command in Canada in favor of Burgoyne and would only continue in his
44
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role as governor. According to Weddle, Germain couldn’t resist getting a last shot in at Carleton,
unfairly blaming his failure to take Lake Champlain in 1776 for developments in an entirely
different theater of the war, stating that “I have had the mortification to learn that upon your
repassing Lake Champlain a very considerable number of the insurgents…immediately marched
from thence and joined the rebel forces in the provinces of New York and Jersey”47,, in effect
blaming Carleton for British losses to the American army at Trenton and Princeton in December
of 1776. Whether or not this was true is irrelevant, and simply was meant to pour salt in the
wound of Carleton’s demotion and forfeiture of command to his former second-in-command.
Carleton was instructed to remain in Canada while Burgoyne would head toward Albany with
the bulk of the army.
As bitter as this news may have been to Carleton, he decided to cooperate with Burgoyne
in the preparations for the campaign. In fact, shortly after arriving back in Canada, Burgoyne
wrote another letter to Lord Germain praising Carleton’s preparation in his absence but warned
Germain that the invasion force would still “fall short of the strength computed in England, (but)
he was confident in the prospect of overcoming difficulties and disappointments.”48 In truth,
Burgoyne was realizing that little had been done to arrange for the logistics of transportation. To
begin with, there were not enough draft animals available to haul artillery, ammunition and
supplies, nor were there enough carts. The ones that had been acquired “were jury-rigged affairs,
constructed of raw, green lumber, including the wheels, many of which lacked iron rims. Those
were hardly the vehicles to survive long journeys over deeply rutted wilderness roads.”49 These
were critical oversights, as it was not just war-making supplies that needed to be transported, but
sustenance for the entire invasion force as well. Furthermore, the baggage train carts were to be
47
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driven by contracted civilians, who were notoriously unreliable for a military operation. Also
needed were boats to ford the river and the lake, and pilots to guide them.
Despite these logistical difficulties, Burgoyne was eager to get underway. On June 3,
Burgoyne began moving the entire operation south to Chambly, on route to the final assembly
and embarkation point of St. John’s, 22 miles southeast of Montreal. One disturbing thing that
Burgoyne noticed in Montreal was that everyone seemed to know about many of the particulars
of the upcoming campaign, even the rank and file. Burgoyne worried that if this many people
knew his plans, surely the Americans must as well.
On June 10, Carleton came down from Quebec to meet with Burgoyne and see him off
just as they arrived at St. John’s. On June 12, Burgoyne’s second-in-command Major General
William Phillips threw a banquet for all the commanders present for the expedition, which was
described as “a festive occasion, with the madeira, Rhine wines, and champagne flowing freely
before the port was served”.50 The following day, a parade and military review were ordered by
Burgoyne in honor of Governor Carleton. Every cannon in the fleet fired a tributary salute, and
the army was “superbly drilled, exquisitely versed in the ritual of review”.51 One notable absence
from the review was the lack of horses for the Brunswick Dragoons. Instead, they marched on
foot. Carleton reviewed the army, and as one final piece of the transfer of command, gave
Burgoyne all the correspondence he had between himself, London, and General William Howe
in New York. Amongst these letters was a letter to Carleton from Howe, dated April 2, 1777. In
the letter, Howe plainly implies that he was “having but little expectation that I shall be able,
from the want of sufficient strength in this army, to detach a corps in the beginning of the
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campaign to act up Hudson’s River consistent with the operations already determined upon”52,
and furthermore, once Burgoyne were to reach and take his first objective of Fort Ticonderoga,
Burgoyne will “have little assistance from hence to facilitate their approach, and as I shall
probably be in Pennsylvania when that corps is ready to advance”.53 It seems Burgoyne, whether
he realized it or not, was on his own before he even left Canada.
From St. John’s, the army marched south to Île aux Noix. It was an uncomfortable march;
German surgeon J.F. Wasmus described this leg of the army’s journey: “the flies and mosquitoes
[marenguens] have almost devoured us; everybody has bumps on hands and face from their
poisonous stings. The faces of several of our men are so swollen from the stings of these little
canaille that one cannot recognize them.”54 From Île aux Noix, the army continued another 30
miles to the west bank of Lake Champlain. On June 19th, “the men were issued ammunition and
flour instead of bread, sure signs that they were nearing the enemy and that, as one officer noted,
‘the affair is becoming serious’”.55 The first objective, which Burgoyne considered the most
formidable, was Fort Ticonderoga. Burgoyne reasoned that once Ticonderoga was in his
possession, the rest of the route to Albany was to be nothing but a simple march down the river’s
edge.
On June 20, 1777, aboard his flagship Maria, Burgoyne ordered cannon to be fired to
signal the commencement of the general movement up Lake Champlain. Burgoyne, for his part,
was in the glory of his career. Now, all the planning was behind him, all that lay ahead was
simple execution, perhaps in more ways than one. The great invasion of the Hudson River Valley
had begun.
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Chapter Two: “The Game is On”

Lieutenant General John Burgoyne was a man of his times. Born in 1722, he was fiftyfive years of age at the outset of the Saratoga campaign. Educated in London, he joined the
British army at the age of sixteen. He was ambitious, as most young British officers of the time
were, and was politically well-connected. He had a taste for gambling and womanizing. In fact,
over the course of his early career, he had moved in and out of the army, something common at
the time. He had married the daughter of Lord Derby at the age of twenty-nine and between the
time of his marriage and the birth of his daughter he had “bought and sold two commissions in
the army to raise cash for paying off gambling debts he had incurred in London” 56. He had a
hand in politics, having served in Parliament in 1762. He was also a playwright and had written a
play entitled The Maid of the Oaks in 1774. Author Kevin J. Weddle states that “in an era known
for rhetorical flamboyance, Burgoyne had a reputation for grandiosity in speech and manner.
(Horace) Walpole called him ‘Burgoyne the Pompous’”57 Burgoyne biographer Lauran Paine
describes Burgoyne as “being a tall, well-proportioned man, solid and sturdy, (who) was
impressive in either civilian or military attire.”58 He was sometimes called “Handsome Jack,” or,
more fittingly, “Gentleman Johnny.”
It should come as no surprise then that upon embarking on his campaign to Albany
Burgoyne issued a proclamation to be printed and passed out not only to his soldiers, but to
anyone encountered along his line of march, whether they be friend or foe. In it, he paints
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himself as the savior “of suffering thousands in the provinces”59. He stresses that his army is “in
the full powers of health, discipline and valour, determined to strike where necessary” 60. He
invites those who are loyal to the Crown to join him, or at the very least to stay out of his way.
But most ominously, directed to the rebels opposing him, he threatens “I have but to give stretch
to the Indian forces under my direction, (and they amount to thousands) to overtake the hardened
enemies of Great Britain and America. I consider them the same wherever they may lurk.” 61 It
was certainly a dramatic proclamation. While Burgoyne meant to instill fear in his opponents, the
proclamation at first caused anger amongst the Americans, but then hilarity. The Independent
Chronicle newspaper in Boston called it “the most bombasting and gasconading proclamation
that British insolence has hitherto exhibited.”62 That this British general would portray himself in
such flamboyant terms courted ridicule, not just in America, but back in London when the
proclamation became known there.
The proposed plan for Burgoyne’s expedition had each regiment moving out in
succession, departing just far enough apart that each regiment would be able to utilize the camp
the regiment before them had used the night before. Sergeant Roger Lamb, in his journal,
describes moving out: “the British army proceeded up Lake Champlain, in batteaux, in the
greatest order and regularity, and landed at the river Boquet, near Crown Point. Here a body of
Indians joined it. A congress was held; general Burgoyne opened the meeting with a speech to
the Indians.”63 Indeed, while at the Bouquet River camp, Burgoyne gathered his main generals
and the Native American warriors that had joined him thus far. In his speech, he sought to rally
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the Indians to his cause, referring to George III as “the great King, our common father and the
patron of all who seek and deserve his protection”.64 He essentially set the Indians loose, stating
“warriors, you are free—go forth in might and valour of your cause—strike at the common
enemies of Great Britain and America”,65 yet, not without precaution, continuing “I absolutely
forbid bloodshed, when you are not opposed in arms. Aged men, women, children, and prisoners
must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict. You shall
receive compensation for the prisoners you take, but you shall be called to account for scalps.”66
Here, Burgoyne is trying to lay a European sensibility upon the Indians, who may or may not
have fully understood his directive.
The British force that embarked up Lake Champlain was composed of three divisions: the
British division, under the command of Brigadier-General James Hamilton, the German division
under Major-General Friedrich Riedesel, and an Advance Corps. under Brigadier-General Simon
Fraser. Second-in-command overall just under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne was Major-General
William Phillips. General Phillips was an artilleryman, who was also a member of Parliament.
He was a veteran of the Seven Years War, and Burgoyne “liked to use Phillips as a sounding
board, testing new ideas or repeating already expressed opinions and waiting for Phillips to
assure him that they were still valid.”67 Phillips “reputation as an artilleryman was legendary.
Burgoyne had good reason to value his company.”68
Of these three divisions, Fraser’s Advanced Corps. was the most specialized, consisting
of grenadier battalions, ranger battalions, light infantry, Canadian militia and volunteers, and a
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company of Indians. Fraser’s purpose was to be the vanguard of the army, advancing well ahead
of the main body. Snow describes Fraser’s command as “an agile brigade that was the tip of the
British spear pushing toward Albany.”69 Fraser’s Corps. was also to cover the right flank of the
army while in battle formation.
In command of the left wing of Burgoyne’s army was Major General Friedrich Riedesel,
in command of all German troops. Riedesel commanded “four infantry regiments, including his
own, along with an infantry regiment and two artillery units from Hessen-Hannau”.70 Of
particular note, according to Lauran Paine, was Riedesel’s “special company of jägers, German
rangers and sharpshooters, taken from different regiments - a kind of elite unit to counteract the
American woodsmen and riflemen.”71 The German troops, or Hessians, as the American’s called
them, were fearsome to behold, consisting of big and burly men that seemed to be ruthlessly
efficient at their military tasks. Also accompanying General Riedesel was his wife, the Baroness
Fredrika Riedesel. This was not necessarily unusual for the time, as many wives (and mistresses)
often accompanied British and German officers on campaign, if not necessarily into battle.
Baroness Riedesel had joined her husband in Canada in June, and having received permission to
follow the army, kept a journal of her experiences, one of the most riveting first-person accounts
of the campaign.
Commanding Burgoyne’s center was Brigadier-General Hamilton, and this division
consisted of four British infantry regiments with artillery. Snow mentions that these British
troops were the “best infantry regiments in the army from Canada. It was also the brigade that
would take the brunt of the coming battle and with which both Burgoyne and Phillips would ride
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when it was joined.”72 It consisted of the 9th, 21st, 62nd and 20th Regiments of Foot, with some
men from these regiments detached to form special companies of grenadiers and light infantry.
Roger Lamb was with the Royal Welch Fusiliers, 9th Regiment of Foot, and mentions that “the
soldiers were in a high state of discipline”73, while Lieutenant Digby, with one of the grenadier
companies lent from the 53rd Regiment of Foot, commented on the soldiers morale and mindset
for duty, echoing Burgoyne’s prediction that “during our progress occasions may occur in which
no difficulty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded.”74 As the main body of Burgoyne’s forces
prepared to depart, General Fraser with his Advanced Corps, as well as Indian scouts, were
already on their way up the lake. On June 25th, Fraser went ashore near Crown Point.
Meanwhile, at Fort Ticonderoga, American General Arthur St. Clair had been continuing
to ready the defenses to the best of his ability with the 2,000 men that he had. In direct
supervision of the construction projects was Lt. Col. Baldwin and Col. Kosciuszko. According to
Richard Ketchum, towards the end of June 1777 “the area around Ticonderoga bristled with
activity - companies drilling, carpenters sharpening tools, work parties heading off to one or
another of an endless list of projects”75; while on Mount Independence, directly across the lake,
“Kosciuszko had 100 men building batteries and forming an abatis; Baldwin supervised another
150 who were sinking caissons”.76 But, would it be enough? General Horatio Gates, who by now
had been sent back north by Congress to assist Schuyler, received a letter from his aide Colonel
James Wilkinson on the state of readiness of Fort Ticonderoga dated June 25, 1777. In the letter,
Wilkinson begins by stating that “the enemy by gradual movements…last evening arrived at

72

Snow, 1777, 23.
Lamb, Journal, 135.
74
Baxter, British Invasion, 200.
75
Ketchum, Saratoga, 153.
76
Ibid.
73

27

Crown Point with some vessels and a part of their army”77, and that he is “persuaded they (the
British) will obtain a true state of our weakness, which will indubitably precipitate their
operations: in which case the post is inevitably lost”78. He cites the garrisons diminishing food
supplies, as well as the difficulties of resupply, as his critical reasoning. He offers his opinion to
Gates that “the most laudable measure…would be to remove our heavy artillery and stores, and
the convalescents and invalids of the army, to Fort George.79 Wilkinson is recommending retreat
of the garrison due to lack of readiness to General Gates. Most interestingly, Wilkinson closes
his letter to Gates with “General Schuyler has been here a few days, but is now in Albany”80,
insinuating to Gates that Schuyler has quit his post just as the enemy is arriving.
Why was Schuyler in Albany on June 25th? It turns out that an election was going on in
Albany. According to Schuyler biographer Gerlach, “on June 20th Jay (John Jay, a New York
provincial congressman) informed Schuyler that the elections in the middle districts were going
so favorably that he hoped soon to be able to address the general as ‘Your Excellency’”. 81 He
may have been there to learn the results of the election. Or to tend to his summer estate near
Stillwater. Either way, Gerlach goes on to state that “in the midst of the June elections, Schuyler
was troubled by military problems…they were all part of the nadir into which his reputation was
sinking - sinking to the point where he could be dismissed from his military command”.82
Historian Hoffman Nickerson offers a counter-point, that Schuyler was in Albany at the time to
offer a last line of defense. He states that “in the rear of the fortress, should it’s defenders be cut
off and forced to surrender, Schuyler had but 700 Continentals…” and that if the forces at
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Ticonderoga should “fail to cripple the invaders in a rash assault upon its strong defenses, must
retire promptly before retreat was cut off.”83 Schuyler was aware of the danger of Ticonderoga’s
fall, and perhaps had withdrawn to Albany to offer a final defensive reserve, however meager it
might have been. Either way, at the time, communication over long distances was slow. The
Committees of Albany and Schenectady may not have been aware that an enemy force had
landed at Crown Point on that date. According to the minute notes for the Albany Committee on
June 25, 1777, they had mobilized a company of troops to deal with someone “skulking in the
woods near the New City, and robbing and plundering the inhabitants of their effects”. 84 They
also found that a man named Abraham Van Aelen “since taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
State of New York, has declared himself a subject of the King of Great Britain” and that he
should be “immediately apprehended and put in close confinement”.85 In Schenectady, the
nearest entry date to June 25 for their committee was June 23, in which “John Stuard Entred a
Complaint in this board against Arent Vedder Concerning a bargain of a Cow.” 86 To address this
concerning issue, the committee in Schenectady “resolved that Stuard be Examined Whether he
is friend of the America states or not and be tended the Oath of Allegiance on his Appearing”, to
which John Stuard replied that he “would not Swear against the king”. So the committee then
“Resolved that said Stuard is not entitled to the protection of this Country.”87 While arguments
over a cow may seem like trivial business, it was not, as “farmers in the outlying districts were
instructed to take their remaining livestock and other animals beyond the range of British

83

Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America (Boston & New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 138-139. Hereafter cited as Nickerson, Turning Point.
84
Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 Volume 1, Minutes of the Albany Committee of
Correspondence 1775-1778 (Albany, N.Y.: The University of the State of New York, 1923), 800, hereafter cited as
Albany Committee Minutes.
85
Ibid.
86
Schenectady Committee Minutes, 1104.
87
Ibid.

29

foragers.”88 It seems that whether or not it was known that Fraser’s Advanced Corps. had landed
near Crown’s Point, the potential was known, and the local committees were indeed preparing
for an invasion.
By June 30th, Fraser had advanced within four miles of Fort Ticonderoga. Burgoyne had
dispatched Riedesel’s wing to the east side of Lake Champlain, the center wing proceeded down
the west shore, and the Indian scouts were making their first contact with the outer ring of
Ticonderoga’s defenses. The Americans withdrew from the outer defenses, setting fire to their
works, and by July 2 the British had occupied Mount Hope, near the old French defensive lines
from the Battle of Fort Carillon in 1758. British Lieutenant Thomas Anburey doubted the
defensive capabilities of the Americans defending Ticonderoga, citing the overwhelming British
naval force assembled, that “it is an invariable maxim with the Americans…never to face an
enemy but with superior advantages and the most evident signs and prospects of success.”89
Burgoyne himself remained upon his headquarter ship Royal George while the rest of the British
gunships came down the lake to block all possible water escape routes north. Indian scouts and
British detachments fanned out and blocked access to Lake George. Riedesel’s German troops
approached Mount Independence from the north but were “running into ‘large swamps and
creeks of considerable depth’,”90 which created doubt in Fraser’s mind as to the merits of
deploying the German troops to that side of the lake. By July 2nd, Ticonderoga was enclosed by
British forces, and the American’s prepared to be besieged. For two days the British shelled Fort
Ticonderoga, and while doing so “they could not help but notice the towering bulk of Mount
Defiance just to the south of the La Chute River.”91 British General Fraser, noticing the potential
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commanding position atop the mount, “immediately sent 40 light infantrymen and a few Indians
to ‘reconnoiter the hill’.”92 Upon assessing the mounts offensive potential, Fraser reported to
Burgoyne that “although it would be difficult, a track could be slashed through the woods, and
artillery could be hauled to the top. If they did, they could dominate the entire area.” 93 The
British had noticed what Trumbull and Kosciuszko had warned the American command about.
At this point, the American commander St. Clair still had no idea as to the actual size of
the British force approaching Fort Ticonderoga. Slowly, he began to find out. On July 3, two
soldiers of Burgoyne’s German troops deserted, and made their way into the American camp.
These Germans told the Americans that they “harbored no ill feelings toward the patriot cause,”
and were “not only especially friendly, but even requested to join the patriot army.”94 They then
proceeded to detail the entire chain of command of the British forces, even detailing that the
German dragoons were on foot, having no horses. In another instance, a captured British
grenadier was tricked into giving up information. Upon being placed in a jail cell, he was joined
by another prisoner who claimed to be a Loyalist. This “Loyalist” offered the British prisoner
some liquor and proceeded to raise a toast to King George III. In short order, the British prisoner
became drunk and began to reveal “the strength of Burgoyne’s army and navy, how many
cannons he had, and how the British planned to secure Fort Ticonderoga.” 95 Turns out, the
“Loyalist” prisoner was actually American artillery Captain Johnson posing as a prisoner, and
the following morning he went directly to General St. Clair with all of the information he had
learned. Now, St. Clair was aware of the size and capabilities of the British force opposing him
and was beginning to realize how untenable his situation might be.
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By now Burgoyne had authorized placing artillery atop Mount Defiance. He placed his
second-in-command General Phillips, a seasoned artilleryman, in charge of the mission. On July
4th, a detachment of British troops began cutting a path to the top of the height, fulfilling Phillips
prophecy that “Where a goat can go, a man can go, and where a man can go he can drag a
gun.”96 By the end of the day, the path was complete, and the British commenced the difficult
task of hauling two medium 12-pounder artillery pieces to the top. The next day, the garrison at
Ticonderoga noticed “a plume of smoke and what were obviously scarlet coats…moving about
on the heights, and it was clear that the enemy was establishing a battery.”97 British Lt. Digby
felt that the British had shown their cards too early, stating that he felt it was a “great oversight in
lighting fires on that post, tho I am informed it was done by the Indians, the smoak of which was
soon perceived by the enemy in the fort; as he should have remained undiscovered till night”.98
St. Clair immediately called a war council of all his senior commanders, realizing that
cannon placed atop Mount Defiance exposed not only the entire garrison to enemy fire, but also
the fortifications atop Mount Independence, as well as Fort Ticonderoga itself. The decision was
made to retreat in as orderly a fashion as possible, and to take as many supplies as they could
carry with them. To cover their withdrawal, St. Clair opted to wait for the cover of darkness. At
sunset on July 5th, the floating bridge between Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence
became clogged with men and material attempting to move across the lake. According to
historian Edward P. Hamilton, “utter confusion reigned everywhere, and discipline, dubious and
tenuous under the best of conditions, collapsed.”99 The fleeing Americans had to get to the other
side of Mount Independence, where there were boat landings and the road to Castleton, which

96

Weddle, Compleat Victory, 117.
Ketchum, Saratoga, 171.
98
Commager, Seventy-Six, 553.
99
Hamilton, Ticonderoga, 195.
97

32

was to be the primary escape route. The plan was to load the sick onto the boats at the landing
site, along with as many supplies as possible, and sail up the lake toward Skenesboro, while all
able-bodied men were to retreat by land over the road toward Castleton, to eventually
rendezvous with the rest. Once reunited, the entire force was to continue to Fort Edward to meet
up with General Schuyler’s forces. Unfortunately, according to Hamilton, climbing aboard the
boats meant for the sick and supplies were “many able-bodied men who should have taken the
Castleton Road. Thus, most of the provisions and essential supplies had to be abandoned.”100 To
keep the retreat as secret as possible, St. Clair ordered no lanterns to be used, and ordered the
sporadic firing of cannon from Ticonderoga to give the British the impression that the Americans
were still there. So far, the British had not noticed the beginnings of the American retreat.
Around 3 a.m., that would change. At that hour, a sudden large explosion blew from the
top of Mount Independence, creating a huge inferno that illuminated the entire area. The British
atop Mount Defiance could now clearly see the American’s running across the floating bridge
from the fort and loading boats at the boat dock. Word of what was happening was immediately
sent to General Fraser. General St. Clair, demanded to know what had happened atop Mount
Independence; it turned out the commander there was found to be intoxicated, and when ordered
to retreat thought it prudent to order “his headquarters to be blown.”101 The cover of secrecy had
been dropped. St. Clair now realized that what had already been a rushed situation could now
turn dangerous and tragic should the British decide to attack at that moment. He ordered the last
of the boats to complete loading and to immediately depart to Skenesboro, while those traveling
via the land route were to immediately begin setting out down the road toward Castleton. En
route, they were to make their way toward the small hamlet of Hubbardton, then turn south
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toward Castleton. By 4:00 a.m., the sun had just begun to rise, and “Fort Ticonderoga had ceased
to be a patriot stronghold.”102
British Lieutenant Digby describes the American withdrawal from Ticonderoga in his
journal. He mentions that after three American deserters had informed the British of the
American maneuver, “the general (Burgoyne) was, without loss of time, made acquainted with it,
and picquets of the army were ordered to march and take possession of the garrison and hoist the
King’s colors, which was immediately done.”103 He goes on to mention that General Fraser with
his Advanced Corps. had already taken off after the Americans. Since the Americans, in their
haste to leave, left the floating bridge from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence in place, the
British on the west side of the lake began to cross the bridge to pursue. As a last defense of the
bridge the Americans had left four men and a cannon to defend the bridge from the east side of
the lake, with explicit instructions to open fire on the British on the bridge if they attempted to
cross. Instead, when the British did cross, and made it to the other side, they found the four men
on the other side with “linstocks lighted and ready to fire, but beside them lay an empty cask of
Madeira. They were all dead drunk.”104 The Americans had thought the floating bridge and
boom, with its massive one-and-a-half-inch link chain connecting the two ends, would pose an
obstacle to the British frigates just behind it, hampering their pursuit. Yet, according to
Hamilton, “only a scant half-hour and a few well-directed cannon shots were needed to break
this obstruction which had caused the colonials so much work”105. As Burgoyne’s force occupied
the area, they could see just how much the American’s had left behind; food, baggage and
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equipment were strewn all about, especially near the docks. With the British ships past the bridge
and boom, they immediately set out in pursuit of the Americans up the lake.
No sooner had the Americans who had traveled by boat arrived at Skenesboro and started
unloading, word came that the British fleet was closing in fast and were just a few miles away.
Soon, the British gunships opened fire on the American boats tied up at dock, igniting them;
many of which still had not been unloaded. The British cannon were “striking gunpowder
barrels, ammunition, and other flammable items on the boats”106, and with the shifting winds,
soon the entire dock area of Skenesboro, and the blockhouse, were ablaze. Colonel Pierse Long,
who had overseen the water-borne retreat for the Americans, was “disgusted, his eyes filled with
tears, (he) ordered everyone to flee to Fort Anne.”107 Skenesboro had turned into an inferno.
As for the American’s fleeing by land, Burgoyne detached Riedesel’s infantry regiment
and Breymann’s reserve corps. from the German wing, to support Fraser’s Advanced Corps. in
pursuit. The first day of the retreat, St. Clair had made it to Castleton with the main body of the
fleeing American’s and serving in command of the rear guard was Colonel Seth Warner, with his
Continental regiment of Green Mountain Boys. The Green Mountain Boys began as a militia
regiment in an area of dispute between the colonies of New York and New Hampshire known at
the time as the Hampshire Grants, today known as the state of Vermont. New York had
attempted to exert control of the area through land grants, and the Green Mountain Boys were
formed from settlers in the area to defend their land against these claims. Their original leader
was Ethan Allen and members of his family, while second-in-command was Seth Warner. Allen
and the Green Mountain Boys, along with Benedict Arnold, led the capture of Fort Ticonderoga
from the British in 1775, yet Ethan Allen was captured later that same year by the British. By
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1777, Seth Warner was now the leader of the Green Mountain Boys, and the unit joined the
Continental Army as a ranger unit. They had joined St. Clair and the forces at Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence just before the British had arrived, and they participated in the withdrawal
as the rear guard of the troops escaping by land. St. Clair had ordered that all unit’s rendezvous
at Castleton, but Warner and the Green Mountain Boys stopped seven miles short of Castleton at
Hubbardton and decided to make camp for the night. They were joined by the 2nd New
Hampshire Regiment under Colonel Nathan Hale, and the 11th Massachusetts Regiment under
Colonel Ebenezer Francis; all told comprising a force of 1,000 men. Just four miles back from
Hubbardton on the road from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, Fraser’s Advanced Corps.
was in pursuit. Between them and Warner, Fraser’s Indian scouts were scouting.
According to Richard Ketchum, Hubbardton was “named for the grantee Thomas
Hubbard, was settled in 1774 by two intrepid families, and a year later, the community boasted
nine widely separated farmsteads”.108 With the approach of St. Clair’s force, the families of the
area had left for the “safety of Massachusetts on the previous day” 109, and now the hamlet was a
ghost town. By the time Warner’s men had reached Hubbardton on July 6, they were exhausted
from the evacuation and the march of over twenty miles. Warner felt that he was in an
advantageous position, selecting as a site for his camp a hill with a small farmhouse upon it, with
a clear perimeter surrounded by felled trees. Nearby was a stream named Sucker Brook where
many of the soldiers and stragglers set up their tents. It may have seemed a safe place to rest, but
“during the night some of Burgoyne’s Indians, for once at least performing their intended
function, scouted the American position.”110 These Indians then reported back to General Fraser,
who had stopped to rest his Advanced Corps. as well. Behind him by just a few miles was
108
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General Riedesel with 1,100 German troops, as well as his company of jägers. Now that they
knew where the Americans were, however, Fraser wanted to get an early start.
By 3 a.m. on July 7, one of Fraser’s loyalist regiments and some Indian scouts had moved
out toward Hubbardton. At about the same time, St. Clair, in Castleton, was informed that the
water-borne escapees had met with the British at Skenesboro and most of their supplies had been
burnt. He sent a messenger back to Warner ordering him to proceed directly to Fort Edward,
instead of Castleton. But Warner had more immediately pressing concerns. At about 5:00 a.m.,
Fraser’s 24th Foot reached the woods near Sucker Brook. Thomas Anburey, who was among the
first of the British to come into contact with the Americans, described how “at about five we
came up with the enemy, who were busily employed in cooking their provisions.”111 Indeed,
many of Warner’s men who had encamped along the brook were preparing their breakfasts, and
upon sighting the British, many fled into the woods, but others stood to fight. During this initial
skirmish, Major Robert Grant of the 24th Foot was shot when he climbed atop a stump to get a
better view of the situation. Anburey calls Grant a “very gallant and brave officer, who in all
probability fell a victim to the great disadvantages we experience peculiar to this unfortunate
contest, those of the rifle-men.”112 Many of the Green Mountain Boys, who Warner had
immediately dispatched to the scene upon hearing the first shots, were crack sharpshooters.
Without their leader Major Grant, the 24th Foot fell back.
Warner soon realized that making a stand here at Hubbardton would allow more time for
the American main body under St. Clair to continue their escape toward Fort Edward. Soon,
Fraser mobilized his light infantry regiment toward a hill with a stone wall atop it. The 11th
Massachusetts was there to greet them. According to British Lieutenant Digby, who was
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amongst the British troops as they “mounted the hill amidst showers of balls mixed with
buckshot, which they plentifully bestowed amongst us. This being the first serious engagement I
had ever been in, I must own...the idea of perhaps a few moments conveying me before the
presence of my Creator had its force.”113
Author Michael O. Logusz relates a story of a young mother who had a home near the
intersection of the road to Castleton, who, upon hearing the opening volleys made her way to the
cellar of her house and covered herself and her baby with a blanket. She hid there while the
battle raged around her.114 Fraser could see that the American’s were between two hills, Sergeant
Hill, and Zion Hill, and attempted to flank their position by ordering his “grenadier battalion of
the 20th Foot…to climb Zion Hill to outflank the patriot left”115 while urging Riedesel to move
forward. Fraser’s center opened fire and the American Colonel Francis was shot in the arm.
Although wounded, Francis opted to remain with his troops. As the British grenadiers climbed
Zion Hill, Colonel Hale’s troops followed, climbing into enemy fire. Warner dispatched men to
assist Hale, without much effect: “despite Warner’s efforts, the advance of the grenadiers could
not be stopped.”116 Hand-to-hand combat ensued for control of the hill, with both sides utilizing
tomahawks, bayonets, and the butts of their guns. Warner ordered a withdrawal back across the
Castleton Road to a more defensible position. Colonel Francis, at the same time, ordered his men
forward. Fraser’s forces staggered, and it briefly seemed as if he would be defeated. Just then,
Riedesel arrived and ordered his Brunswick light infantry to “strengthen the British flank.”117 He
ordered his men to loudly play music as they advanced to give the impression of a much larger
force. The wounded American Colonel Francis fought on, but this onslaught proved too much. A
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German bullet finally took him down. According to Lieutenant Digby, who saw Colonel Francis’
body after he was killed, “his appearance caused me to remark his figure, which was fine & even
at that time made me regard him with attention.”118 With Francis gone, his troops wavered, and
began to scatter. At just that moment, Fraser ordered his men to fix bayonets and move forward.
Realizing there was not much more to be done, Warner ordered his troops to “scatter and meet
me in Manchester!”119 This they did, and Fraser advanced to take the field. Emerging from her
cellar following the battle, the young mother saw that her home was riddled with bullet holes and
dead bodies were strewn all around outside. According to author Richard Ketchum, the
casualties from the Battle of Hubbardton were grim: “the British and Germans had lost sixty
dead, the rebels forty-one; the attackers had 168 wounded, the defenders ninety-six. The chief
difference was that more than two hundred Americans were taken prisoner.”120 Logusz puts the
battle in perspective: given the size of the forces engaged and the duration of the battle, the
casualty percentages from Hubbardton are comparable to “some of Europe’s largest land battles,
such as the 1815 Battle of Waterloo or the American 1863 Battle of Gettysburg.”121
As Fraser mopped up the battlefield, the American prisoners were sent back to
Ticonderoga. The British claimed to had won the day, as the Americans had scattered from the
battlefield, yet “the young and largely inexperienced patriot Continental and militia units
commanded by Colonels Hale, Francis and Warner demonstrated true professionalism, bravery,
and a strong elan in combat against elite forces.”122 Most importantly, Warner, and those under
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his command at Hubbardton, slowed the British advance toward the main body of the army
under St. Clair, now en route to Fort Edward.
The next day, July 8, Colonel Pierse Long, who had overseen the water-borne retreat
from Ticonderoga, made it to Fort Anne. In pursuit was the British Ninth Regiment under
Lieutenant Colonel John Hill, accompanied by 20th and 21st Regiments. These regiments had
been landed after the debacle at Skenesboro. As they made their way toward Fort Anne, they
“overtook the boats carrying the invalids, women and baggage up Wood Creek”.123 What they
didn’t know, was that by this time, the commander of the Northern Department General Philip
Schuyler had dispatched “a reinforcement of four hundred militia from New York under Colonel
Henry Van Rensselaer.”124 Schuyler, who had been in Albany at the time of the evacuation of
Ticonderoga, dispatched Van Rensselaer north from Fort Edward upon hearing the news.
Fort Anne was the site of a fortification built in 1757 during the French and Indian War,
yet by 1777 consisted of little more than a blockhouse. As British Colonel Hill approached the
Americans, he “reported to Burgoyne that the dispirited Americans were huddled at the fort and
were ripe for the picking.”125 In response, Burgoyne sent reinforcements. American Colonel
Long, seeing that Hill only had about 190 soldiers with him, decided to attack. Moving out from
the blockhouse, the Americans “crossed the creek and from a thick wood raked the British left
flank”.126 According to Roger Lamb, a sergeant with Hill’s force, “the British outline of centries
received them with the greatest bravery and steadiness, and obliged them to retreat; they then
formed again, and came on with redoubled violence.”127 Hill’s force held out for two hours until
their ammunition was almost gone, when suddenly the war cries of Indians rang out from the
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surrounding woods. The Americans, sensing that the British Indian allies had arrived, pulled
back to the blockhouse. Fearing that the rest of the main British force would soon be upon them,
the Americans “set fire to the fort and marched off to Fort Edward, about sixteen miles away.”128
It turns out, it wasn’t a band of Indians at all, but one solitary British officer, Captain John
Money, who had rushed the battlefield yelling war cries, imitating the Indians who had recently
abandoned him, as they were “too smart to get in the middle of the white men’s free-for-all in the
forest.”129
The entire American defense at Ticonderoga proved to be an embarrassment. Burgoyne,
for his part, was proud of his accomplishments to this point of the campaign, and on July 10th,
had no hesitation in informing Lord Germain back in London. He had seized the “Gibraltar of
North America”130, and told his troops that they had done a “‘material service to the King’ and
had given a ‘signal honor to the profession of Arms’”.131 He did, however, enclose a private note
to the secretary in his correspondence back to London. He felt that the Indians under his
command, “unless they were strictly controlled, ‘enormities too horrid to think of would ensue;
guilty and innocent, women and infants would be common prey.’”132 He was afraid of the very
weapon he had championed. Even still, Burgoyne was in the glory of his career.
This did not seem to be the case for Generals Arthur St. Clair and General Philip
Schuyler on the American side. The American forces were in disarray, with Warner’s force
heading to Rutland and St. Clair’s force limping along toward Fort Edward. By July 14, St.
Clair’s forces arrived in the vicinity of Fort Edward. Burgoyne had by now consolidated his
forces at Skenesboro. Once out of danger, many of the American’s began to “accuse St. Clair of
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treachery”133 for abandoning the post at Ticonderoga, without really putting up much of a fight.
Some were even accusing both St. Clair and General Schuyler of being traitors, and a rumor
began circulating that Schuyler and St. Clair were “paid for their treason by the enemy in silver
balls, shot from Burgoyne’s guns into our camp.”134 The Continental Congress in Philadelphia
had no idea what was really going on; “all they knew was that Ticonderoga was gone and that
every soldier in Schuyler’s department appeared to be running from the enemy.” 135 In their
minds, it was time to begin thinking of new leadership for the Northern Department of the
Continental Army. Throughout the month of July, St. Clair’s remnants from Ticonderoga, now
combined with the forces of Schuyler, proceeded to inch south, felling trees, damming creeks,
and destroying bridges along the way to make the progress of Burgoyne that much more
difficult. Somewhere, and sometime in the not-too-distant future, a final stand needed to be
made.
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Chapter Three: “A Gathering Storm on My Left”

One of the primary problems with how the Continental Army was structured was the
system for rank advancement. Typically, rank should be established based on merit, experience,
and seniority. Instead, the Continental Congress itself reserved the right to appoint general
officers, and shortly after being named Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, General
George Washington provided Congress with a list of “the number of generals of various grades
he required to conduct the war.”136 Congress decided that promotion would occur only with a
simple consideration of these virtues, but adding that it would also consider promotion based on
whether or not each colony could fill their quotas for troops. Many times, Congress neglected to
consider seniority at all when making their selections for promotions. “In an army staffed by
officers who were exquisitely sensitive to their ‘honor’, such political meddling invited
trouble.”137 One such officer that this occurred to was New Hampshire Colonel John Stark.
Authors Richard and John Polhemus in their biography of Stark describe him as “a lean,
tough, seasoned soldier” who was “thin, blue-eyed and weathered. His soldiers, the men who
knew him best, believed in him.”138 With the outbreak of the war, Stark, from New Hampshire,
was placed in command of militia regiments from that colony, and marched to join the
Continental Army during the siege of Boston. Stark was forty-nine years of age by the time of
the Saratoga campaign and had already seen action in the war at Bunker Hill and was with
Washington’s army at Trenton and Princeton. John Stark was known as a rugged individual, with
a strong independent streak, who was also an extraordinarily proud military man. In early March
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of 1777, when he found out that “Congress now appointed Enoch Poor as the new brigadier
general from New Hampshire even though he was junior to Stark”,

139

Stark promptly resigned

from the Continental Army and returned to New Hampshire.
By mid-July, word was starting to reach New England that Fort Ticonderoga had fallen
and that the American forces that were there were on the run. Following the American dispersal
ending the Battle of Hubbardton, Seth Warner and his Green Mountain Boys were now arriving
in Manchester. The New Hampshire legislature met to coordinate their defense and decided to
organize an expedition to the Hampshire Grants to assist. In naming a potential commander for
the expedition, Representative John Langdon suggested to the body that “our friend John Stark,
who so nobly maintained the honor of our state at Bunker Hill, may safely be entrusted with the
honor of the enterprise and we will check the progress of Burgoyne.”140 They immediately sent a
messenger to John Stark to offer the command, and Stark accepted; with the express condition
that he have the “full authority to direct their operations according to his own judgement, without
responsibility to any authority other than their own body”.141 Stark made it clear that he would
only take orders from the New Hampshire legislature and their Committee of Safety, and would
not be answerable to the Continental Army whatsoever.
New Englanders had never really taken a liking to General Schuyler. As a wealthy New
Yorker, he may have seemed a bit too aristocratic for their tastes, and newspapers in Boston did
not take the news of Schuyler and St. Clair’s predicament lightly. And it wasn’t just New
England that had begun to hear of the debacle at Ticonderoga. By now, word was spreading
throughout the surrounding areas, in particular to Philadelphia and to the Continental Congress.
According to Kevin J. Weddle, many members of Congress “noted with dismay the demoralized
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tone of Schuyler’s letters and hoped that the dreadful loss of Ticonderoga might just clear the
way for Gates to return to his old post.”142 General Horatio Gates, who already had
disagreements with Schuyler over command issues between the Northern Department Army and
the Army in Canada, had just recently addressed Congress where he “audaciously recited his
own merits”143 in preparing Ticonderoga’s defense, strengthening the idea that the whole mess
was Schuyler’s fault. Gates was looking to take command.
Meanwhile, as Burgoyne’s force moved south, many civilians fled toward Albany. In the
area between Fort Edward, Skenesboro and Albany, the sparse populace was “terrorized by
marauding Indian and loyalist bands, frequently augmented by Canadian mercenaries, and
fearful of what might happen to them should they find themselves under British occupation”.144
Entire homesteads and farms were abandoned before the British advance, and Burgoyne’s scouts
were committing all sorts of atrocities, including torture, rape and murder. According to Michael
Logusz, “despite Burgoyne’s explicit orders to refrain from unnecessary killing and scalping, and
to spare women, children, and prisoners, his orders were largely ignored.”145 Many Indian raiders
did not differentiate among the locals whether they were pro-British or pro-American. To Indian
warriors, the scalp was a war trophy. While these atrocities were happening, they were discussed
in the local newspapers to dramatic effect, creating a palpable fear which reverberated
throughout the wilderness.
In mid-July, Washington, headquartered in Morristown, New Jersey, was watching
General William Howe’s forces in New York warily. Unsure of where Howe would strike next,
Washington had moved his army to the area to enable movement either north, if Howe decided
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to move up the Hudson River to assist Burgoyne, or south should Howe decide to move on
Philadelphia. On July 10th and 11th, Washington received messengers from Schuyler with
frantic news, informing the Commander-in-Chief that St. Clair had evacuated Ticonderoga, and
confirming that the fort had fallen to Burgoyne. Washington was incredulous, calling the loss
“among the most unfortunate that could have befallen us”.146 Washington needed to make a
decision, realizing that if Burgoyne succeeded in reaching Albany, the result would be as
dangerous to the American cause as whichever move Howe was going to make. He decided to
send Schuyler reinforcements, although, he could barely spare any. He issued an urgent call to
the New England colonies to supply militia to the Northern Army’s aid as quickly as possible.
He also realized that New England militia men only truly preferred to be led by their own, so he
dispatched two of his ablest commanders to assist: Major General Benjamin Lincoln, a “fortyfour-year-old Massachusetts farmer who had ‘proved himself on all occasions an active, spirited,
and sensible man’”,

147

and Connecticut-born Major General Benedict Arnold, who, just like

John Stark, “was threatening to resign because Congress had promoted several junior officers,
who now outranked him”.148 Washington refused to allow Arnold to resign, and sent him north
to assist Schuyler. Washington considered Arnold to be the most aggressive field commander he
had. Perhaps the rationale for Washington parting with these two gifted commanders was the
news that on July 23, Howe’s fleet, carrying the bulk of his army, “was seen off Sandy Hook,
heading for the open ocean”.149 Washington gambled that Howe was heading to Philadelphia.
Burgoyne, at the same time, was consolidating his forces at Skenesboro. Skenesboro,
located at the southern tip of Lake Champlain, is today called Whitehall, New York, and claims
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to be the birthplace of the United States Navy. This is where the ships were built that were used
by Benedict Arnold in 1776 to stop Carleton’s earlier British invasion upon Lake Champlain,
which Arnold eventually checked at Valcour Island. The founder of the town, Philip Skene, was
a known loyalist and ally of Burgoyne. While his army regrouped, Burgoyne rested in comfort at
Skene’s home. He sent letters back to London with news of his conquest of Ticonderoga. He also
sent a supply request back to Canada for more horses and wagons. To facilitate the movement of
his heavy artillery, he chose to send these by boat, along with “some bulky supplies over water
from Ticonderoga to Fort George, and the rest of the army overland from Skenesboro to Fort
Anne to Fort Edward and then on to Albany”150. The route of the bulk of the army would be
through very rough terrain, and Burgoyne realized that a road needed to be cut from Skenesboro
though to Fort Edward. This decision may or may not have been encouraged by his host, Phillip
Skene, who was, after all, a businessman. Skene owned all the surrounding land, and to enhance
the value of his property, what better than to have an actual British army cut “a good road,
running from Skenesboro to the Hudson River on which he would be able to exploit his land
much more”.151 Skene also claimed that “many loyalists abound in this region.”152 A claim that
Burgoyne believed.
Also joining Burgoyne’s forces at Skenesboro was a large body of Ottawa Indians, whom
Lieutenant Digby described as “being painted in their usual stile and decked out with feathers of
a variety of birds, and skins of wild beasts slain by them as trophies of their courage; and general
Burgoyne, by the help of interpreters, informed them of the cause of the war”. 153 On July 23,
Burgoyne was finally ready to move out from Skenesboro to Fort Edward. Once again Fraser’s
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Advanced Corps. would lead the way, with Indian scouts probing out in front. Ironically, it was
the very same day, July 23rd, that Washington had observed Howe moving out toward what he
guessed was Philadelphia.
Much can be said about the terrain in Burgoyne’s path. From modern-day Whitehall,
New York (the former Skenesboro) to Fort Edward, New York is 23.4 miles. Today, it would be
a leisurely drive-by-car of 34 minutes. A modern hiker, presumably aided by modern equipment,
could make the trek in 7 hours and 37 minutes. Today U.S. Route 4 follows this path. However,
in 1777, U.S. Route 4 did not exist. Instead, the journey involved a road that “needed to be
improved. Bridges needed to be reinforced or built, and thickets and brush growing upon the
road had to be cleared. The nasty black flies constantly gnawed at the men and animals”, and
soon the men “began to suffer from various illnesses including dysentery and scurvy.”154
Riedesel’s German dragoons found it even more hard going, as their uniforms were designed for
horseback as cavalry uniforms. They were not designed for marching. What horses they did have
were sent away by Burgoyne to assist with the artillery. German surgeon J.F. Wasmus, remarked
in his journal that “since we are not used to marching, our march today has been very painful for
us”.155
While Burgoyne was on the move, Schuyler sought to delay the British advance as best
as he could. As he moved south in response to Burgoyne, he “had evacuated and destroyed Fort
George and strewn obstacles in Wood Creek.”156 He also requested that the Polish engineer
Kosciuszko “construct obstructions on all the roads the enemy might use”. 157 This included
felling trees along the roadside to delay progress, as well as destroying bridges. It also included
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digging trenches from the nearby streams to flood the roadway. Despite these difficulties,
Burgoyne’s force finally arrived at Fort Edward on July 29, a full five days after they had set out.
They found Fort Edward empty and burned to the ground. Nailed to a tree, a letter was found that
plainly stated “thus far shalt you go and no farther”.158 The further Burgoyne moved into the
wilderness, the more ominous it became.
Just three days before, on July 26th, the western prong of the three-way advance toward
Albany got underway in earnest. This force was to be led by Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger.
St. Leger was born in Ireland and had seen action with the British army in Canada during the
French and Indian War. His command consisted of “about 200 regulars, 200 provincials, 300 to
400 Germans, and an expected 400 or 500 Indians-for a total of more than 1,200 effectives”.159
St. Leger’s primary mission was to cross Lake Ontario from Canada, rally at Oswego, advance
on and take Fort Stanwix in western New York, and continue down the Mohawk River to
Albany, where, according to the plan, he was to meet up with the forces of Burgoyne
approaching from the north and Howe approaching from the south. Fort Stanwix was located
near what was Iroquois territory and had been the site of the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix which
was meant to establish a boundary between the British colonies and the Iroquois Confederacy. In
May of 1777, Fort Stanwix was under the command of American Colonel Peter Gansevoort, who
commanded a garrison of only about 700. Upon St. Leger’s approach from Lake Ontario,
Gansevoort opted not to defend Fort Oswego, and pulled back and fortified Fort Stanwix, which
to St. Leger seemed to be his only major obstacle between himself and his objective of Albany.
General Schuyler realized the potential vulnerability of the Mohawk Valley and dispatched two
hundred Tryon County militia to assist Gansevoort. Yet, by July 26, this militia had not yet
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arrived, which Gansevoort reported back to Schuyler “along with the intelligence that a large
body of Loyalists and Indians were at Oswego and were thus only a few days sail and march
from the fort.”160 St. Leger’s force was on its way.
In 1772, Tryon County had been formed from the western part of the vast Albany
County. The reason that it was formed was due to the increasing prosperity the area enjoyed in
the fur trade, and the “farmer’s wheat, butter and pearl ash (which) brought good prices in
Albany and New York”.161 The petition to create the county was brought to the New York
Assembly by Sir William Johnson, easily the most influential man in the area of the time. Due to
Johnson’s military successes during the French and Indian War, the British had made him
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern Colonies, an office which allowed his family
and friends to prosper. The area became a cultural melting pot over the next 50 years, as both the
Iroquois and British settled refugees there: the Iroquois with the Tuscarora’s, and the British with
the German Palatines, who had sought the assistance of the British Empire in their flight from
famine, war and religious persecution in their homeland. After the death of his German wife, Sir
William Johnson formed an “intimate relation with a prominent Mohawk woman at Canajoharie,
Molly (Mary) Brant.”162 Johnson ended up mentoring Molly’s younger brother Joseph. During
the political upheavals leading to the outbreak of the revolution, Johnson and his family were
solidly on the side of the British, in direct opposition to those around them. Just two years after
the formation of the county, in August 1774, the Tryon County Committee of Safety was formed
to harass loyalist support. Interestingly, one month prior, Sir William Johnson “suddenly died.
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His death came just as colonial protests…were about to propel Tryon County’s multiracial,
multiethnic population toward revolution.”163
On July 27, just before his forces had arrived at Fort Edward, Burgoyne learned of an
incident that had occurred in the area. A young loyalist lieutenant named David Jones was
marching with Burgoyne’s force. He had become engaged to a young woman named Jane
McCrea near Saratoga, New York, but when the war broke out in 1775, he fled to Canada due to
his loyalist beliefs, leaving his fiancé behind. When he reached Ticonderoga as part of
Burgoyne’s expedition, he sent for his fiancé. She travelled to meet him at Ticonderoga, making
it as far as Fort Edward. Once there, and perhaps knowing that the British force with her fiancé
was approaching, she moved in with another woman with loyalist sympathies, Sara McNeal.
Lieutenant Jones continued with Burgoyne’s army, and as he approached Fort Edward, knowing
that his fiancé was there, sent for her to join him in camp, as he felt she would be safer with him.
What happened next is subject to historical debate. Author Michael Logusz believes that
Jones had “dispatched a few Indians to pick up Jane to escort her back to camp”. 164 Kevin
Weddle barely mentions McCrea’s engagement to Jones (other than a brief reference to Lt.
Digby mentioning it in his journal), instead implying that McCrea and McNeal were victims of a
random attack by Burgoyne’s Indian scouts. Either way, two Indian warriors grabbed both Jane
McCrea and Sara McNeal from the house that they were staying in and started to bring them
back toward the British camp. A young boy who had witnessed the abduction alerted a body of
American militia, who set out in chase of the two abducted women. Here again, there is some
cloudiness to the story. Logusz goes with the account of Samuel Standish, an American soldier
who had earlier in the day skirmished with an Indian raiding party. He claims that the two Indian
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abductors of McCrea and McNeal met up with another band of Indian raiders, and an argument
ensued as to claim over the prisoners. In the confusion, one of the Indians fired a musket at Jane,
killing her. “Within moments, an Indian warrior named Wyandot Panther ran up, and in a fury
scalped her”. On the other hand, Weddle goes with the account of Wyandot Panther himself,
who, upon arriving back at Burgoyne’s camp “displayed the scalp of a young woman with
distinctive long, blond hair.”165 Panther claimed that he nor his colleague had killed McCrea, and
that she had been shot by an errant shot fired by the pursuing American militia. Panther went on
to claim that “he had merely taken advantage of her death to acquire the desirable scalp.” 166 Few
believed Panther, but either way the result was tragic, as Lieutenant Jones was there at the camp
when Panther had arrived and instantly recognized the scalp as that of his fiancé.
When word reached General Burgoyne, he was livid. He felt he had specifically
forbidden his Indian allies to attack women or children, and strongly discouraged scalping, yet
since the large group ot Ottawa Indians had joined his force at Skenesboro, these atrocities
seemed to increase, whether Burgoyne looked the other way or not. This case however, was one
that could not be ignored, for “he felt - in fact he knew - that his reputation had suffered; that one
of those acts had occurred from whose consequences the person thought to be at fault could not
escape”.167 He immediately called for the surrender of the responsible person, Wyandot Panther,
and meant to hold a hasty court-martial and hang the murderer as an example to the rest of the
Indians in his force. However, just before issuing this order, General Fraser offered Burgoyne
some sound advice. If he were to put Wyandot Panther “to death for waging war in the
traditional Indian manner”, then the rest of his Indian allies would “abandon the column…which
was getting closer to the safety of Albany every day, (leaving Burgoyne) at the mercy of
165
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American rangers and woodsmen”. Burgoyne relented and decided to turn justice for the murder
over to the Indian chiefs, which, of course, would administer no punishment to Wyandot Panther.
But it was too late, the damage had been done. Disgusted with what had happened, many
loyalists decided to leave. Burgoyne once again issued a directive to the Indians that murder and
scalping of innocents was forbidden, and from here on out, every Indian unit would be
accompanied and commanded by a British officer. “Beginning the next day, Indians began to
depart. Some went back to their villages, disgusted with the white-man’s war”.168 As his Indian
allies began to depart, Burgoyne was losing his scouts that were the eyes and ears of his force.
Yet, the fallout from the McCrea affair would prove to have even worse consequences for
Burgoyne. The news of Jane McCrea’s murder by Burgoyne’s Indians “soon became the chief
item of conversation across New England and New York State, especially in communities close
to the frontier”.169 The story was so sensational, and so gory that newspapers began to tell the
story, such as the New York Gazette, the Pennsylvania Evening Post, the Massachusetts Spy, the
New Hampshire Gazette, and the Virginia Gazette. With each retelling of the story, it became
more dramatic. The descriptions of Jane McCrea, a “woman as young and beautiful, with a
pleasing disposition, intelligent, and possessed, of course, of those lovely long tresses”170,
portrayed a victim of the Indian “savages” that even if she were connected to Burgoyne through
one of his own soldiers, the British general could not even protect her. If the Indians could do
this to their own allies’ relations, what would they do when, as Burgoyne had earlier succinctly
warned, been “given stretch” against the American civilians in Burgoyne’s path? Even General
Horatio Gates admonished Burgoyne, later reminding him in a letter that “Miss McCrea…met
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her murderer employed by you”.171 Civilians began to flee the area through which it seemed
Burgoyne may be advancing, but more importantly, it drove home to these civilians that
Burgoyne must be stopped. According to Logusz, in reaction to the story of the murder of Jane
McCrea, “hundreds of men shouldered muskets and rifles, drew knives and tomahawks, and sped
off to join the war effort to avenge her. Very soon Burgoyne himself would feel the full fury of
her murder.”172
Indian atrocities were happening all across the theater of operations. The same day that
the Jane McCrea murder occurred, an equally horrific atrocity took place in Tryon County, just
outside of Fort Stanwix. According to author Kevin Weddle, “three young girls from local farms
were picking berries in the woods near the fort when Indians attacked them. Two of the girls
were killed and scalped, and the other, though critically wounded, managed to make it to the
safety of the fort.”173 Gansevoort and the garrison at Stanwix were horrified. Knowing that St.
Leger’s force was approaching from Lake Ontario, Gansevoort gathered all the local women,
children and sick and sent them to relative safety. Much like the murder of Jane McCrea, “the
murder of the two girls galvanized the Mohawk Valley and contributed to the enthusiastic militia
turnout.”174 Gansevoort continued to prepare for St. Leger’s advance, issuing orders to his men
to be ready at a moment’s notice. On August 1, St. Leger dispatched his own Indian scouts to
probe the area, and on August 3 began to encircle Fort Stanwix.
Upon St. Leger’s arrival at Fort Stanwix, he was surprised by what he found, writing to
Guy Carleton in Canada that “instead of the insultable and unfinished work we were taught to
expect, I found it was a respectable Fortress strongly garrisoned with 700 men and demanding a
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train of artillery we were not masters of for its speedy subjection.”175 Gansevoort, for his part,
had enough supplies to withstand a siege of at least six weeks, although the garrison was running
short on ammunition. St. Leger realized that Fort Stanwix would not be an easy conquest, but
more of a difficult obstacle on his way to Albany. Hoping to intimidate the garrison into
surrender, St. Leger amassed his force before the fort, with his Indian allies in full regalia, and
paraded them. He then sent one of his captains, under a flag of truce, to the fort to request
surrender. Gansevoort “contemptuously rejected any offer”.176 The British then began building
breast works around the fort to begin siege operations, although St. Leger lacked any real
firepower, as the fort was “fully impervious to the popgun artillery the British had brought with
them.”177 He had his men begin constructing a road back over which he could transport heavier
guns. On August 5, he received word from Indian messengers “that a (patriot) force of militia
under Nicholas Herkimer was on its way to relieve Fort Stanwix”.178
Herkimer, who was the head of the Tryon County militia, had about 760 men with him,
and upon learning of the beginning of the siege of Fort Stanwix marched from Fort Dayton,
about 30 miles away, to help relieve the garrison at the fort. Many of the men with him were
Palatine Germans, and he was supported by Oneida scouts. The Oneida were one of the tribes of
the Iroquois Confederacy who sided with the patriot cause. As they approached Fort Stanwix,
Herkimer sent three of his men ahead to the fort to notify Gansevoort that he was on his way and
asked him to detach a force from the fort to assist. The signal that the force was leaving the fort
was to be the report of three cannons. Gansevoort readied 250 men to go out and join with
Herkimer’s militia and put his second in command Marinus Willett in charge of the foray.
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St. Leger, upon hearing of Herkimer’s advance, asked his two closest advisors, Joseph
Brant, and Sir John Johnson their advice. Brant was a Mohawk war chief who sided with the
British and led a band of volunteers consisting of Mohawk and loyalists. Sir John Johnson was
the son of Sir William Johnson and led a group of loyalist volunteers. Brant advised that they
should set up an ambush and wipe out the approaching American force, while Johnson advocated
attempting to negotiate with Herkimer and the militia, as he personally knew many of the men
with Herkimer and “understood that a bloody brother-against-brother battle could potentially
poison the valley for generations.”179 After considering both options, St. Leger decided to attack
the Americans, and went with Joseph Brant’s plan, with Johnson assuming overall command of
the operation.
Brant knew the area well and set up an ambush of the unsuspecting Americans where
“the road crossed some heavily wooded high ground cut by three ravines.” 180 The plan was such
that as the vanguard of Herkimer’s force entered the low ground between the ravines, part of
Brant and Johnson’s force would block the road. At the same time, the end of Herkimer’s
column would be in a low part of the ravine, and the middle of Herkimer’s column would bunch
up from lack of ability to move forward. At that moment, Brant’s Mohawks would descend on
the middle of Herkimer’s column in force. The plan seemed foolproof, yet, both sides consisted
of inexperienced militia men, a factor Brant did not take in to account.
As Herkimer’s vanguard approached the pass, they saw a fresh stream, and broke ranks to
stop and drink some water. One of the loyalist volunteers with Brant and Johnson prematurely
opened fire, which caused Brant’s Seneca warriors to join in as well. “In a few minutes,
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(Herkimer’s) 1st Regiment scouting detachment was all but wiped out.”181 Shortly after these
initial premature volleys, the rest of Brant and Johnson’s force attacked. The “impact and
ferocity of the attack were devastating”,182 and Herkimer, leading the column, was shot in the left
leg. Some of his men grabbed him and pulled him into the woods. Just at that moment, Brant’s
Mohawks attacked the end of Herkimer’s column. Many of the American’s tried to run, but
“Brant’s Mohawks quickly and methodically chased them down, killing and scalping along the
way”.183 Back with the main column, the entire ravine descended into chaos as muskets were
fired at point-blank range and fighting devolved into a bloody hand-to-hand struggle for survival.
The wounded Herkimer, through messengers, managed to rally what was left of his column on
some high ground. Johnson ordered a loyalist bayonet attack on this position but was repelled.
Johnson then requested reinforcements from St. Leger, who dispatched about 75 men to assist.
Meanwhile, the requested American reinforcements sent out under Marinus Willett had
discovered a relatively abandoned Indian and loyalist camp on their way to meet Herkimer,
which they proceeded to loot. They then returned to Fort Stanwix, never making it to the site of
the ambush of Herkimer’s column, which was still six miles away. This action may have saved
what was left of Herkimer’s column, as once the Indians still fighting Herkimer found out their
camp had been looted, they disengaged. The fighting was finally over, “after more than five
hours of no-quarter combat.”184 According to Barbara Graymont, “in terms of killed and
wounded and failure of objective, the Battle of Oriskany was the greatest of tragedies for the
Americans.”185 Authors Tiedmann and Fingerhut place casualties from the battle as 50 wounded
and 200 killed on the American side with 30 taken prisoner, while the loyalists under Brant and
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Johnson lost about 50 men, and the Seneca lost 30 killed.186 Nicholas Herkimer, the American
leader of the relief column that was ambushed, died eleven days later from complications from
having his leg amputated. One unique aspect of the Battle of Oriskany was that it was a truly
North American battle, meaning both sides contained combatants either from or native to North
America, with little interference from their European counterparts. The Patriots and Loyalists
that fought each other were neighbors, while the American-friendly Oneida battled their Iroquois
Confederacy compatriots, the Seneca and Mohawk. According to Weddle, “it would take
generations for the hatred and animosities to dissipate.”187 St. Leger believed he had won a
victory at Oriskany, and of Herkimer’s men that got away, he reported to Burgoyne that they
“only served to spread the panic wider.”188 On August 9, two days after Oriskany, he sent a
formal demand to Gansevoort to surrender Fort Stanwix. Gansevoort refused, and the next day
St. Leger began bombarding the fort.
While this was happening in the western theater, Schuyler, now joined with St. Clair’s
remaining force, continued to move south toward Stillwater before Burgoyne’s advance. As he
marched past Fort Miller, his rearguard was “torching everything in his wake.”189 Near Batten
Kill, he crossed the Hudson River, putting as much distance between himself and Burgoyne as he
could. The river would present one more obstacle to Burgoyne. By August 3, Schuyler’s entire
force made it to Stillwater. While there, Schuyler met with Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the Polish
engineer who had warned the Americans of the danger of not fortifying Mount Defiance near
Ticonderoga. Kosciuszko was in the area preparing fortifications for the potential eventuality of
Burgoyne reaching Albany. About twelve miles to the south of Stillwater, Kosciuszko had
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ordered breastworks to be built on Van Schaick Island, at the confluence of the Hudson and
Mohawk Rivers, which are still visible today. Schuyler made his headquarters at the Van Schaick
Mansion.
By now, newly minted Brigadier General John Stark of the New Hampshire militia had
assembled his men. On July 24, Stark had received an urgent letter from Seth Warner,
commander of the Green Mountain Boys who were now assembling at Manchester. “Urging the
necessity of your speedy assistance.”190 Stark immediately dispatched 700 men to Manchester,
then began to move the rest of his men and provisions, including “all the rum and sugar.”191 By
August 7, Stark’s militia were in Manchester. When Stark arrived, he was met by General
Benjamin Lincoln of the Continental Army, who delivered a message from General Schuyler that
Lincoln was to march Stark’s collected men to join Schuyler’s force. Stark bluntly replied, “that
my orders was not to put myself under the Command of the Continental Troops” and would be
marching his men to Bennington. Lincoln didn’t argue with Stark and wrote a letter to Schuyler
informing him that Stark would be acting independently.
Burgoyne, in the meantime, had been corresponding with both Howe in New York and
Germain in London. Howe congratulated Burgoyne on the capture of Ticonderoga but reminded
Burgoyne that his eyes were on Washington’s army, pledging that if Washington “goes to the
northward…be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you”.192 Burgoyne, however, at this
point, continued to see no problem with taking Albany alone. After all, St. Leger was moving
down the Mohawk Valley, for all he knew. Yet, Burgoyne was beginning to have cause for
concern. Many of his men were becoming sick, and his Indian and loyalist allies were leaving
camp daily. Even some of his regulars began leaving, which prompted Burgoyne to issue an
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order on August 6 threatening that his Indians (that were left) would “immediately (be) sent in
pursuit, who have orders to scalp all deserters.”193 Not only was desertion a concern, but some of
his supplies, like meat, were running bad, and diminishing with every step. His supply lines back
to Canada, by now, were stretched thin. The commander of his left wing, General Riedesel, had
suggested a raid upon the countryside in the Hampshire Grants to forage for supplies.
Furthermore, there was a known American supply depot in the vicinity of Bennington, just ripe
for the taking.
On August 9, Burgoyne dispatched German Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum to raid
the American depot in Bennington. Baum was directly under the command of General Riedesel,
and Riedesel’s wife, the Baroness Riedesel, describes the decision in her journal, that Baum was
detached “for the purpose of seizing a considerable magazine of stores in that town; an
expedition that General Riedesel thought very unadvisable, and against which he emphatically
contended.”194 Baum moved out with “762 German, British, Loyalists Canadian, and Indian
soldiers and warriors, (and) was accompanied by two 3-pounder artillery pieces.”195 His orders
were to gather horses for the German dragoons, gather loyalists, forage, and to gather work cattle
for food and transport. Just before he left, Baum was reassured by Burgoyne that the depot at
Bennington was lightly guarded.
Today, in Bennington, Vermont, there is an obelisk commemorating the Battle of
Bennington. Tourists to the area may think that this is where the battle occurred, but it is not. The
obelisk marks the relative spot where the American supply depot was located, which was the
objective of Baum’s mission. The battle occurred in Walloomsac, New York, about 9 miles from
193
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the site. Once again, to illustrate relative distance, for a modern hiker it would take about three
hours to hike.
German surgeon J.F Wasmus described Baum moving out on the morning of August 9:
“we set out at 5 o’clock this morning, marched to our left through the camp of the Breymann
Corps and attached ourselves to the baggage of the Fraser Corps, that had likewise set out on the
march; our march continued along the Hudson River.”196 Many of Baum’s German troops
carried broad swords, a heavy implement that only slowed down their march. Once again, Baum
dispatched “some of the loyalists and all of his Indians far ahead.”197 As they moved, they
slaughtered and burned everything they encountered. They also encountered a few loyalists, who
joined the march. These same loyalists, and others along Baum’s route, could not keep quiet, and
soon John Stark learned of Baum’s movement. Stark sent out “about two hundred New
Hampshire militia under Colonel William Gregg to gain intelligence and to ‘stop their
march.’”198 As with Burgoyne, the local farmers began to drive their cattle into the wilderness,
out of reach of the British. They also grabbed their guns.
On August 10, upon hearing the news of the Battle of Oriskany and the predicament of
Gansevoort at Fort Stanwix, Schuyler dispatched Ebenezer Learned to the area. Yet, “when
Benedict Arnold characteristically volunteered his services for the expedition”199, Schuyler
ordered him to take command of the expedition.
The same day, August 10, Schuyler received a letter from John Hancock, president of the
Continental Congress. He had been relieved of command of the Northern Department of the
Continental Army. Furthermore, there was a congressional inquiry into his and St. Clair’s
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conduct regarding the fall of Fort Ticonderoga. He was ordered to report, along with St. Clair, to
General Washington’s headquarters. On August 19, his replacement, General Horatio Gates
reported to the Northern Department’s headquarters at the Van Schaick Mansion.
But during Schuyler’s retreat toward Van Schaick Island, the American army passed a
defile where the terrain moved close to the edge of the river, where only one road passed. Near it
was a tavern owned by Jotham Bemis, which “afforded an unobstructed view for miles in almost
every direction.”200 Finally, the retreating American army found a place to make a last stand.
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Chapter Four: “The Battles at Bennington & Freeman’s Farm”

On August 13, Major General Benedict Arnold moved out toward Fort Dayton to relieve
the siege of Fort Stanwix. Arnold was 36 years old at the time of the Saratoga campaign and had
taken part, along with Ethan Allan in the seizure of Fort Ticonderoga in 1775. Before the war, he
had been a merchant, operating ships on the ocean and engaging in legal, and sometimes illegal
trade. This naval experience served him well when Schuyler had ordered the building of a fleet at
Skenesboro to defend Lake Champlain in 1776. Arnold was credited with stopping the British
advance up the lake that year at the Battle of Valcour Island, even though the battle itself was a
technical British victory. Exquisitely sensitive to his own honor and personal glory, he felt in
February of 1777 that officers junior to him were being promoted before he was and had
threatened to resign from the Continental Army. He traveled to Philadelphia to discuss this issue
with members of the Continental Congress, who then promoted him to Major General, but
without restoring his seniority over the junior officers who had already been promoted. Because
of this, he threatened to resign a second time, yet General Washington refused to accept his
resignation, instead assigning him to assist General Schuyler in the Northern Department. By
doing this, perhaps Washington had hoped that Arnold could find the glory he so desperately
craved, and Schuyler needed the help, badly. Kevin J. Weddle describes Arnold as someone who
was “volatile and easily took offense” yet considers Arnold to be “perhaps the most dynamic
combat leader on either side”.201 General Ebenezer Learned’s men, a force of about 700 men,
was already on their way toward Fort Dayton, and Arnold rode out to join them and take
command. Joining him was Gansevoort’s second-in command Marinus Willett, who had ridden
out from Fort Stanwix to Albany to request assistance on a secret mission. Willett provided
201
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Arnold with “valuable intelligence on the conditions in the fort, the strength and dispositions of
St. Leger’s force, and the route.”202 Along the way, Arnold attempted to rally the Tryon County
militia to join him for a second push on Stanwix, but he was only able to convince about 100
men, as many had either survived or heard of the ferocious battle that had taken place on August
6 at Oriskany. Although he was not able to convince more men of the militia to join him,
Arnold’s force did capture a group of Tryon County loyalists, among them a man named Hon
Yost Schuyler, who happened to be a cousin of General Schuyler. Arnold realized that if he
attempted to approach Fort Stanwix over the same path that Herkimer had earlier gone, he may
be walking into the same type of ill fortune that met Herkimer’s force. Instead, Arnold devised a
plan to trick St. Leger’s force surrounding the fort. He convinced Hon Yost that he would be set
free if he traveled to the British lines and convince the Indians there that “a large rebel army was
approaching”.203 Hon Yost agreed to the special mission and took along “a number of Oneida
Indians to corroborate his story.” When Hon Yost got to the British lines, he convinced the
Indians there that there was a large rebel body approaching the fort from Fort Dayton. The
Oneida with him verified the story, even going so far as to insinuate that Burgoyne had already
surrendered, and that there were no British forces to assist if St. Leger continued the siege. The
story spooked St. Leger’s Indian allies, and although St. Leger attempted to rally his force to
proactively attack the approaching American column, he “learned that some two hundred
warriors had already decamped and that he must retreat, or the rest would abandon him.”204
Realizing that continuing with the siege without his Indian allies was a lost cause, St. Leger
decided to end the siege. Within just a few hours, St. Leger’s force abandoned their trenches
surrounding Fort Stanwix, secured their equipment, and began making the trek back toward
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Oswego. Arnold sent units of his force in pursuit, and Arnold’s Indian allies joined in, exhibiting
the same type of brutal warfare on the stragglers that Brant’s Indians had unleashed on
Herkimer’s men.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General John Stark’s men continued to assemble near Bennington.
Richard and John Polhemus describe Stark’s force as a ragtag bunch, who “looked like a
collection of farmers on a hunting trip.”205 Many were young boys, and some were old men who
were veterans of the French and Indian War. Nearly all were outfitted with their own hunting
rifles that they had from home. Stark was also joined by “companies from Massachusetts and
New York, in addition to the volunteers from New Hampshire and Vermont.”206 All told, it was a
force of roughly 1,500 men.
Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum’s detachment continued to move toward Bennington.
Locals in the area fled at the news of the approaching British and German force. The “Hessians”
were particularly feared. For those in the area that could read, “newspapers carried accounts of
Hessian cruelty at Long Island including the murder of prisoners with bayonets.”207 They told the
stories to their neighbors. While many civilians in the area were leaving, Stark’s scouts patrolled
the area. As Baum’s movement was slow-going, what with the condition of the roads and the
heavy equipment they carried, they started to sporadically come under fire from the surrounding
woods. J. F Wasmus describes the fighting tactics of the Americans in the woods: “either lying
on the ground or standing behind trees, they load their guns and shoot. They run from one tree to
another and then forward as circumstances demand, and the Savages do likewise.”208 During one
brief skirmish, Baum’s force encountered about 50 Americans, and managed to capture five of
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them. The prisoners informed them that over 1,500 Americans lie ahead of them, commanded by
General Stark. With this news, “Baum’s German and English officers became apprehensive.
They knew that Stark was a hellion…if it was true that Stark was waiting for them, then Baum’s
force was heading for trouble.”209 Baum then dispatched a message back to General Riedesel,
with a request that “he order Lieutenant Colonel Breymann to Baum’s relief with a company of
jägers and a battalion of chasseurs and grenadiers.”210 The Americans who were not captured
fled, and returned to Stark with the information that Baum’s force was approaching. Stark
immediately sent a message to Manchester to inform Seth Warner and his Green Mountain Boys
to be ready to march at a moment’s notice. At the same time, more Berkshire County militia had
arrived in Stark’s camp from Massachusetts, as well as a group of Stockbridge Indians. Stark’s
force had by now swelled to close to 2,000.
On August 14, the two forces spotted each other about eight miles from the supply depot
at Bennington near the Walloomsac River. Stark fell back about a mile to a more defensible
position, and Baum occupied a hill overlooked the river crossing. Here, Baum began to fortify,
creating a redoubt on top of the hill and breastworks surrounding the hill for a half-mile. He
deployed a British unit with one cannon down the hill to cover the bridge itself, and across the
river a group of “two hundred Loyalists occupied a redoubt to cover the roads there.”211
Meanwhile, Stark’s force made camp for the night, while small groups of his marksmen prowled
through the woods searching for targets.
It rained heavily for the entire day of August 15, preventing any action from either side,
but on August 16 the skies cleared, and in the morning, Stark gathered his officers. Evaluating
the hill Baum had fortified, Stark proposed a pincer movement. He would send “250 men around
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to the rear of the enemy’s left wing…300 soldiers would wade the Walloomsac, cross the
Bennington Road, and fan out”212, while another detachment would assault the loyalist works
across the river. Stark himself would lead “300 men…to storm the enemy center in a frontal
attack.”213 In a final rallying speech to his men before the assault was to commence, Stark
declared “There are the redcoats, and they are ours; or Molly Stark sleeps a widow tonight.”214
By now, Seth Warner had joined Stark, riding ahead of his Green Mountain Boys. Around noon,
Stark’s plan went into action, when the proposed flank attacks moved out first. A militiaman
from Berkshire County, upon reaching his pre-designated post, waited, “and there, pursuant to
orders, sat in silence until a signal (the firing of two muskets) was given, when the American
army, upon three sides of the British encampment, made a simultaneous attack.”215 At about 3:00
pm, men under Colonel Samuel Herrick opened fire against Baum’s redoubt on the hill.
Michael Logusz describes the scene: “the stillness of the forest was shattered as hundreds
of rifle and musket rounds poured into the German, British, loyalist, and Indian positions.”216
Manning the redoubt was most of Baum’s German dragoons, as well as some marksmen from
Fraser’s Advanced Corps. The fire was so heavy against the redoubt, that many of the men
inside, when they rose to take aim, were immediately shot through the head. Earlier in the
morning, Baum had received word that Breymann’s relief force was on its way, and Baum felt
that all they would have to do was hold on out until they arrived. When the firefight started,
Baum’s Indian allies fled into the woods. Multiple times the German’s attempted to break out of
the redoubt, and multiple times were pushed back into the redoubt. Baum personally led one of
these attempts to break out, when “suddenly, a powerful round struck the German commander.
212

Ketchum, Saratoga, 304.
Ibid.
214
Ibid., 305.
215
Polhemus, Stark, 260.
216
Logusz, Musket & Tomahawk, 191.
213

67

Collapsing to the ground, he was unable to move. As Baum lay dying, the German effort to break
out began to lose its impetus.”217 At this point, the American’s began topping the hastily made
log walls of the redoubt, and the entire scene devolved into a melee of hand-to-hand combat. The
German’s, who had their march to Bennington slowed by the heavy broadswords they carried,
not utilized this weapon against their attackers. The American’s used bayonets, swords, pikes,
and the butts of their rifles, and sometimes used their fists. According to one German survivor,
“outnumbered, broken and somewhat disheartened…our people wavered and fell back, or fought
singly and unconnectedly, till they were either cut down at their posts, obstinately defending
themselves, or compelled to surrender.”218 All of Baum’s units were under heavy attack, and
they each began to collapse. Soon, whoever of Baum’s men who weren’t killed or wounded,
were captured. German surgeon J. F. Wasmus was captured during this phase of the battle,
describing how “one grabbed me by the arm, and another said he should kill me, whereupon he
placed the bayonet of his gun with a tightened trigger on my chest.”219
Stark’s plan had been a success. The American’s began mop up operations, disarming
and taking prisoners of who was left. While this was going on, some American militia began to
loot the enemy outposts, and Stark began to lose control of his men. Just at that moment, Stark
received word that Breymann’s relief force was just about two miles away. Rallying his men,
Stark dispatched “four small detachments to delay the enemies advance until he could get his
forces back under control.”220 When Breymann’s men saw the New Hampshire militia
approaching, another skirmish erupted, soon growing into a full-fledged second battle. Breymann
had his horse shot out from under him. When this happened, Breymann stood up and ordered his
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two 6-pound cannons to be brought forward. With this, the American’s began to fall back, but
continued the fight, as they “ducked behind trees and rock walls, and backed into higher terrain.
A running gun battle ensued.”221 A messenger was sent back to General Stark to warn him of the
advancing German force. Completely surprised, Stark began to rally his troops to confront this
new threat. At that moment, Colonel Seth Warner suggested to Stark to set up a skirmish line of
the troops they could get together, and he also ordered Major Ran’s mounted horse unit forward.
“Ordering his men to dismount, Rand’s highly disciplined force went into action”222, firing at
will at Breymann’s soldiers. Breymann himself was hit by a shot, receiving a flesh wound to the
leg. Stark continued to more of his force into the fight, and just at a critical moment, the rest of
Seth Warner’s troops arrived, “some 130 Green Mountain Boys, with over 200 rangers”. 223 The
rangers were sharp shooters, and specifically targeted the officers of Breymann’s command. By
8:00 pm, Breymann had enough, and ordered a retreat, abandoning all their equipment and most
of their wounded. The survivors of Breymann’s unit fled west, back toward Burgoyne’s main
army.
The foray to Bennington had been a disaster for Burgoyne. Baum and Breymann were
completely unable to secure the supply depot, depriving Burgoyne’s force of much needed horse,
ammunition, food and other provisions. Max M. Mintz places the losses at the Battle of
Bennington as “two hundred and seven Germans were dead and seven hundred captured; thirty
Americans were killed and forty wounded. The Americans took four brass cannon, two hundred
fifty broadswords, four ammunition wagons, and several hundred muskets and rifles.”224 These
were losses that Burgoyne could simply not afford and could not be replaced. He was also now
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realizing that his opponent was a worthy adversary, and not a rag-tag collection of farmers that
he had thought. Writing to Germain back in London, he describes the loss at Bennington: “the
great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress in principle and zeal…the Hampshire
grant in particular…now abounds in the most active and most rebellious race of the continent
and hangs like a gathering storm on my left.”225 His pleas for assistance from General Howe to
the south in New York became even more urgent.
On August 19, General Horatio Gates arrived at the Van Schaick mansion where
Schuyler had made his headquarters to assume command of the Northern Army. The outcry in
Congress over the loss of Ticonderoga and St. Clair’s evacuation proved to be too much to save
Schuyler. When Schuyler protested that he wasn’t even at Ticonderoga when it fell, Samuel
Adams sneered that “it was well known that he had never been used to keep his own person near
his army.”226 Furthermore, Congress was looking for a new commander who would secure the
loyalties of the New England militia, who had never taken to Philip Schuyler, but were sorely
needed to confront the threat from Burgoyne. Gates, after learning of his new command, was
asked how much militia he thought he might need from the surrounding states to supplement the
Northern Army, to which he replied “7,750 men: 3,500 from Massachusetts, 750 from New
Hampshire, 750 from Connecticut, 1,500 from New York, 500 from New Jersey, and 750 from
Pennsylvania.”227 As Gates had been popular amongst the New England troops, his request for
these men, and whether the quotas were fulfilled by the states, would prove his drawing power.
When Schuyler learned that he had been relieved of command, “for three days he could
not be spoken with.”228 After this brief period of mourning, Schuyler waited to meet with Gates
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when he took command. When Gates arrived, Schuyler, even though he had been ordered to
report to Washington in New Jersey, offered to stay on in the area to help Gates organize the new
militia that were by now starting to arrive in camp. Gates, for his part, decided that his first order
of business was to reverse the gloomy air of defeatism and proclivity to retreat that the Northern
Army had exhibited thus far, and he was determined to move back toward Burgoyne instead of
away. From the star, Gate’s began to order clothing and equipment for the army from the
surrounding states, and to instill discipline among the ranks. He also “introduced daily drills,
greater cleanliness in camp and in the hospital, and strict inspections. The improvement was
immediately apparent.”229 Although Gates sought to turn the army’s retreat around, this tactic
that Schuyler oversaw had placed the Northern Army in a stronger position. Although Schuyler
had been in command when Ticonderoga was lost, St. Clair’s withdrawal kept most of the
garrison intact, and they now formed the core of the growing force now at Stillwater.
Furthermore, by retreating, Schuyler managed to draw Burgoyne deeper into the interior of New
York, and by now Burgoyne’s supply lines back to Canada were stretched dangerously thin. Yet,
despite Schuyler’s offer of assistance to Gates, Gates had no use for him. Just a few days after
Gates arrived, Schuyler left, and began to make his way toward Philadelphia.
Just a few days after Gates took command, his requested militia began to arrive. Among
the first arriving on August 21 was Colonel Morris Graham’s Ulster County Regiment, who was
assigned to Glover’s brigade. Also on August 21, Congress received the news of the defeat of
Burgoyne’s foray into the Hampshire Grants at Bennington. Shortly thereafter, General Benedict
Arnold returned to camp after his campaign to relieve Fort Stanwix, and with his return he
brought the news that the British force under Barry St. Leger had lifted the siege of Stanwix and
had retreated to Oswego. It was likely known however, that even though St. Leger had
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withdrawn, his force was likely to return over Lake Ontario and back to Canada, likely
eventually moving toward Fort Ticonderoga to assist Burgoyne. On August 31, Colonel Daniel
Morgan, with his elite unit of 578 riflemen arrived in camp, having been reluctantly dispatched
from Washington’s army at the urging of Congress. “On arriving, Morgan dined with Gates, his
neighbor from the Valley of Virginia.”230 To Morgan’s command, Gates added “an elite battalion
of five newly formed light infantry companies of three hundred men under Major Henry
Dearborn.”231 On September 1, Connecticut light horsemen and militia infantry units arrived.
Gates force was swelling by the day. According to a return from Gates Deputy Adjutant General
James Wilkinson, by September 7 the Northern Army consisted of 7,548 Continentals, including
commissioned and noncommissioned officers, present and fit for duty.”232 Mintz goes on to state
that when you add Morgan’s Corps., as well as the incoming militia from the surrounding states,
“the total came to over 10,000, and Gates wrote to Hancock (President of the Continental
Congress) that ‘the militia was coming daily’.”233 Gates was about ready to move the army
toward Burgoyne to invite an engagement. That same day, Gates began moving the army toward
the defile where the terrain moved close to the river and to the only road through to Albany that
Burgoyne would be forced to take. The American army had noticed the area previously as a
defensible spot, as dominating the road was a long ridge known as Bemis Heights. Polish
engineer Thaddeus Kosciuszko was so convinced that the area was the prime point of defense
that he had been hard at work on the area for the last few weeks, digging entrenchments and
fortifying the Heights.
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Things in the meantime had not been going particularly well for Burgoyne. By now, he
had moved his headquarters south to Fort Miller, where he had paused the army briefly to
receive some provisions from Canada. These provisions wouldn’t be enough, and the failure of
the expedition to Bennington deprived Burgoyne of much needed supplies. According to author
Lauran Paine, “a subtle feeling, rarely commented on, of plain need to survive, was beginning to
replace that earlier proud confidence”234 that Burgoyne had exhibited earlier. At the same time,
what remained of his Indian allies met, and decided that Burgoyne’s force was not in as good
position at this point then they had hoped. “The result of this council was that all but 80 of the
remaining Indians packed up and departed.”235 Also, many of his loyalist allies were leaving as
well. Lieutenant Digby mentions in his journal that “many of the inhabitants, who before came
into our camp for protection, calling themselves Torys, went from us over to the enemy.” 236 In
fact, as early as August 20 Burgoyne was starting to worry about his position. He still hadn’t
heard from St. Leger, or Howe, for that matter. Burgoyne kept the army in Fort Miller for four
weeks, awaiting some sort of resupply to continue his trek toward Albany. Now he began to
think that he had waited too long. He had to move. He was also beginning to get word that the
American force opposing him was growing in number daily.
Finally, on September 10, he began to move out. His army had managed to acquire
provisions for about five weeks from Canada during the long wait. Also, while in Fort Miller,
Burgoyne had ordered the bateaux brought down from Lake George to Fort Miller. These
bateaux would be utilized to move the bulk of the armies supplies down the river while the army
marched on foot. But before that, the bateaux would be used to create a floating bridge across the
Hudson to facilitate the armies move to the western bank of the river. After a further delay of
234

Paine, Gentleman Johnny, 136.
Ibid.
236
Baxter, British Invasion, 255.
235

73

two days due to heavy rains, on September 13 Burgoyne’s army crossed the Hudson and
established camp “at Saratoga on the Schuyler estate grounds. Burgoyne set up his headquarters
in his former counterpart’s mansion.”237 When he crossed the Hudson, Burgoyne was taking a
gamble that he could make it to Albany, and once the bateaux that acted as a floating bridge
where disconnected, Burgoyne had effectively cut his line of communication and supply back to
Canada.
In the meantime, Gates was continuing to move the American army to Bemis Heights.
Knowing that Burgoyne was approaching, Gates would require materials to build the
fortifications on the Heights. He dispatched Colonel Baldwin with a Massachusetts Continental
regiment north to reconnoiter supplies. Baldwin was able to locate several sawmills, and had his
men remove “40,000 planks and boards, numerous boxes of nails, crates of tools, tar pitch
barrels, wagons, and other items.”238 These items would be used to build the fortifications on
Bemis Heights that Kosciuszko had been planning. While Baldwin’s men were gathering these
items, they also went about destroying many of the bridges in the area that had spanned the
multiple ravines north of Bemis Heights that Burgoyne would have to cross.
On September 17, Burgoyne moved his army across the Fish Kill Creek, and was now
positioned just four miles from Bemis Heights. As the British approached, there skirmishes
between the scouts of both armies. Some of the British scouts encountered armed civilians. Both
sides, as a result of these skirmishes, began taking prisoners, and when these prisoners were
returned to Bemis Heights, they were letting the American’s know vital information regarding
Burgoyne’s force. At the same time, American prisoners that were coming into the British camp
were revealing to Burgoyne just what consisted of the force opposing him. By September 17,
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most of the fortifications the Americans had built on Bemis Heights were complete, the result of
“nearly 10,000 soldiers, augmented with civilians, (who) toiled at the project”239, day and night.
The entire defensive system stretched for over four miles. A large trench was dug from the
Heights down and cut through the river road leading to Albany. Three-sided cannon batteries
were installed to the north. In the center of these fortifications stood a farmhouse, owned by John
and Lydia Neilson. As Burgoyne approached, John sent his wife Lydia to her parents’ home to
the south, and John, being a member of the 13th Albany County Militia Regiment joined his unit
in assistance building the fortifications around his own home. The house was reinforced with
lumber and burlap and canvas bags filled with sand, (and) it became known as Fort Neilson.”240
One contribution to the American army at Bemis Heights was the maintenance of robust supply
lines coming up from Albany and the Hudson Valley to the south, something Philip Schuyler,
with his aptitude for logistics, had organized prior to being relieved of command.
Gates decided to organize his force into two main divisions, with the left wing of the
army being commanded by Major General Benedict Arnold, and reserving command of the right
wing for himself. Also under Gates direct command were units of Continental Dragoons, a light
horse brigade, artillery units as well as the necessary staff required for an army, such as
engineers, a quartermaster, a commissary and a hospital. Arnold’s wing included Daniel Morgan
and his riflemen, Enoch Poor’s New Hampshire and New York Continentals with two units of
Connecticut militia. Ebenezer Learned’s brigade consisted of Massachusetts Continentals as well
as a battalion commanded by James Livingston. According to historian Dean Snow, “by
September 15 the erosion of British strength and the growth of American strength had brought
the two armies to near parity in numbers. Both Gates and Burgoyne believed they could prevail,
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and the scene was set for a major battle.”241 Gates, being a defensive commander, had full faith
in Kosciuszko’s defense system. He decided to wait for Burgoyne to bring the battle to him.
Since Arnold’s return from Fort Stanwix, he began to take on officers in his command
and staff that had worked with Gates predecessor Phillip Schuyler. This annoyed Gates, as he felt
those men were only loyal to Schuyler, and now Arnold, and the situation had the potential to
undercut Gates authority. “As the armies edged closer to one another, Schuyler’s former officers,
now on Arnold’s staff, ridiculed the new army commander.”242 This only exacerbated the
situation, as Schuyler’s former staff was reporting back to Schuyler, accusing Gates of having
poor eyesight and of deliberately exaggerating the numbers of Burgoyne’s force. These
annoyances between Gates and Arnold would eventually come to a head, but for now would
have to be tolerated, as Burgoyne had been positioning pickets between the two armies and
appeared to be preparing to probe the American defenses on Bemis Heights imminently.
Burgoyne, who by now had established a headquarters at another farmhouse in the area
known as Sword’s farm could see that the American defenses were designed to block the river
road through to Albany. He was determined to push forward to see if there was a way through.
On the morning of September 19th, Burgoyne’s force began to move. Once again, Burgoyne
dispatched his Indians and Loyalists out front as scouts and divided his force into three columns.
At 9:00 am, all three columns began to move out: the right column consisted of Fraser’s
Advanced Corps. and Breymann’s Corps, who had returned from Bennington. This wing’s
mission was to “skirt the Great Ravine and seize and hold the high ground to the west of Bemis
Heights.”243 The center column, commanded by Burgoyne himself, would play the main part of
the plan advancing toward the American center. The left column, consisting of Riedesel’s
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German troops, was “charged with opening the Albany Road and fixing Gates in position.”244
They would also be protecting the hospital and baggage train, which needed to proceed either
down the river road or down the river itself. A signal gun signaled the start of the advance, but it
was not easy going for either one of the columns. Fraser’s right wing had a long route through
the woods to their designated position, while Riedesel on the left had to contend with the many
bridges that the American’s destroyed to hamper their progress. The center columns progress
was better, as they were able to quickly cross the Great Ravine due to a bridge that was still in
order that the Americans had neglected to destroy. By 12 pm, all three columns had reached their
positions.
Back in the American camp, the tension between Gate’s and Arnold continued. The two
disagreed on how to best counter Burgoyne’s advance, with Arnold wanting to “seize the
initiative and attack; he believed they could catch Burgoyne on the move and inflict maximum
damage.”245 Gates disagreed, opting instead to stay in his defensive position and wait for
Burgoyne to attack. Burgoyne had seen the hill to the American left, and realized the importance
in controlling at, as it would the British right in position to rake the entire American defensive
line. Arnold realized this weakness as well and tried to convince Gates to deploy Morgan and
Dearborn’s men to that side of the battlefield. As a compromise, Gate’s agreed. Morgan and
Dearborn’s men moved out.
At about 12:45 pm Morgan’s men, who had been climbing trees to observe the British
movements, could see British skirmishers begin to enter the clearing of the abandoned clearing
known as Freeman’s Farm. As previously mentioned, the farm had been abandoned in 1775 by
John Freeman and his son, who had fled to Canada due to their loyalist leanings. They had joined
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Burgoyne’s expedition toward Albany, and now, ironically, may be fighting a battle on their own
farmland. As for Morgan’s men, the terrain around Bemis Heights perfectly suited their style of
warfare, as many of the men were experienced woodsmen, and very much accustomed to
prowling forests and landscapes just like it. Also, Morgan’s men carried rifles, that were highly
accurate for the time, with each rifleman able to hit a man at 300 yards. Once Gates had agreed
to send Morgan’s men out in a “reconnaissance in force”, he directed Arnold to come to their
assistance with whatever means necessary. Just after 1 pm, a small group of Morgan’s riflemen
encountered some of Burgoyne’s scouts and took after them in chase. They then came upon the
main part of Burgoyne’s center column, commanded by Burgoyne himself. The riflemen fled
back into the woods. Morgan was upset that his men had prematurely engaged the British and
thought many of them had been killed. “Fortunately, Morgan had his turkey-call. The sharp
whistle enabled the riflemen to determine his location, and soon they gathered around him.”246
As Morgan rallied his men, Arnold dispatched to regiments of New Hampshire Continentals to
assist, and a full engagement erupted. Some of Morgan’s men returned to the trees, where they
specifically targeted the British officers. Both sides started to pour reinforcements into the
firefight. The British lined up at their end of the field, and fixed bayonets. The British moved
forward “with bayonets dripping blood”247. At this moment, the 8th Massachusetts charged at the
British force. As at Bennington, the fight devolved into a hand-to-hand melee, and a “tomahawk
to bayonet struggle”.248 As the British thrust continued, they did break through in piecemeal on
the American left and began firing down the American line. Arnold and Morgan now noticed a
large gap had formed in the British line. Arnold felt that this may be an opportunity to get in the
rear of the British, and so dispatched Morgan and Dearborn’s troops to the gap, to be supported
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by General Learned and his brigade, as well as the 10th Massachusetts from General Patterson’s
brigade.
Upon hearing the eruption of the firefight, General Riedesel, on the river road, had
dispatched some of his artillery toward the area to support the British line, and now, Fraser, who
had seen the gap that Arnold was trying to exploit, sent forward Riedesel’s artillery as well as the
24th Foot and Breymann’s regiment. Here, they clashed directly with the force Arnold had sent
through the gap. “The two sides shot it out at point-blank range. Then they lunged at one
another.”249 The British continued to bring up additional cannon. By 4:00 pm, the fight had been
going on for four hours. The Americans would rush forward to take British cannon, only to have
the British counter and take the cannon right back. At about this time, Arnold saw another
opportunity to collapse the British center, and requested that Gates move some of the force
guarding the river road to assist, but Gate’s refused as he feared Riedesel would exploit the
reduced manpower along the river road. Interestingly, at about the same time, Riedesel saw the
danger of the British center collapsing and dispatched some of his “Brunswick light infantry
regiment to double-time toward the center.”250 Disgruntled that Gates would not spare troops to
the center, Arnold managed to rally some militia and Continentals to hold the line. As this was
happening, various units of New York militia were beginning to reinforce the American line.
Breymann’s unit backed up the British center and was finally able to repulse Arnold’s repeated
attempts.
By 6:00 pm, the battle had been raging for six hours. At this point, “Burgoyne knew that
someone or something would have to give.”251 His troops were exhausted, and it would soon be
dark. Just at that moment, Riedesel arrived in the center and sent in his grenadiers will his
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artillery fired grapeshot at the Americans. He then ordered a bayonet charge. Finally, the
Americans began to fall back. Both sides were exhausted. The Americans could not contend with
the grenadier charge and fell back to their defensive positions on Bemis Heights. By now,
darkness was beginning to fall, and both sides stopped firing. The Americans, while putting up a
dogged fight, had left Burgoyne in charge of the field. By 9:00 pm, the first Battle of Saratoga
was over, otherwise known as The Battle of Freeman’s Farm.
Both sides eyed each other wearily throughout the night, with just about everyone
keeping their weapons close by. According to the journal of Lt. Digby, throughout the night they
“heard the groans of our wounded and dying at a small distance, yet could not assist them till
morning, not knowing the position of the enemy, and expecting the action would be renewed at
daybreak.”252 The temperature dropped dramatically throughout the night. Kevin J. Weddle
discusses the casualties on both sides as being heavy, with “the Americans losing almost 100
killed, 325 wounded, and 40 missing (most of them prisoners), and Burgoyne’s army 160 killed,
364 wounded and 42 missing.”253 The British lost quite a few of their officers, who were easily
identifiable to Morgan’s sharpshooters due to the bright metal breastplate’s they wore. Although
Burgoyne had retained the field, the battle had done nothing for his strategic situation, and the
significant American force remained entrenched on Bemis Heights, continuing to effectively
block his path toward Albany.
The next day, both sides waited for hostilities to resume, but no attack came from either
side. Once this was realized, Burgoyne went to work fortifying his position on the field of
Freeman’s Farm. While Burgoyne was still keenly aware of his supply issues, he now had a new
headache to deal with, the care of the British wounded in their field hospital.
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After the battle, the feud between Generals Arnold and Gates escalated. On September
22, Gates moved Morgan and Dearborn’s under his own command. Arnold had worked and
coordinated closely with these units during the battle, and by Gates doing this, he was effectively
“stripping away much of the credit Arnold earned for his units’ performance.”254 The same day,
Gates sent his official report to the Continental Congress informing them of the action. In the
report, he neglected to mention General Arnold’s very significant contributions to the battle, a
fact that infuriated Arnold. He “stormed into Gates headquarters demanding an explanation for
the report.”255 Gates informed Arnold that General Washington had dispatched General
Benjamin Lincoln to join the Northern Army, and that upon his arrival Arnold would no longer
have a command as Lincoln outranked him. According to Weddle, the conversation “quickly
degenerated into an exchange of profanities.”256 In fact, during the entire battle, Gates was in the
rear, and it was Arnold who organized the resistance that prevented Burgoyne from breaking
through that day. Arnold was so upset, that he requested to be transferred back to Washington’s
army in New Jersey. “In a brief two-sentence reply, Gates formally told Arnold that his request
to leave the army was approved.”257 When on September 26, almost all the senior commanders
passed around a petition asking Arnold to stay, he relented and decided not to leave. Yet, Gates
had already relieved him of command.
As mentioned, The Battle of Freeman’s Farm did little to alleviate Burgoyne’s
strategic situation. By now, Burgoyne was aware that General Howe had moved on Philadelphia,
and that St. Leger’s force had given up on the Mohawk Valley. His last bit of hope for assistance
from the south now lie with British General Sir Henry Clinton, Howe’s second-in-command that
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Howe had left in charge in New York City. On September 21, Burgoyne received a letter from
Clinton, dated September 12, in which he stated that “if you think 2000 men can assist you
effectually, I will make a push at (Fort) Montgomery in about ten days.”258 It seems now that
there was a promise of assistance from the south, however meager it might be. However, ten
days’ time would mean that Clinton wouldn’t leave New York until at the earliest September 22,
and probably wouldn’t make it to the vicinity of Albany until at least about a week later.
Hopefully, Burgoyne’s food supplies would last that long. In the meantime, Burgoyne “decided
to beef up his defenses.”259 Once again, Burgoyne settled in for another waiting game, although
by now his situation was in danger of becoming extraordinarily dire. He would wait as long as he
could for the potential relief of Clinton coming north, but eventually, he would need to act.
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Chapter Five: “Bemis Heights, Surrender & Aftermath”

Now, Burgoyne entered a waiting game. Both sides sent parties out to collect their dead in the
days following the Battle of Freeman’s Farm. Many of the corpses were looted by camp
followers from either side, who purloined any valuables they might find. On the first night, many
of Burgoyne’s remaining Indians silently crept through the battlefield to collect their grim
trophies of combat, the scalp. It was dark and eerie across the landscape and freezing cold. It was
a peaceful eternal sleep for those that died, but for those wounded in the battle they lay in agony
all night, and when found “begged to be left to die rather than suffer the agony of being carried
back to the hospital.”260 While both sides waited for an attack the following day, which never
came, Burgoyne considered his options.
Sir Henry Clinton in New York had offered to send an expedition of about 2,000 soldiers
north to attack the Hudson Highland forts of Montgomery & Clinton in an effort to pull away
some of Gate’s American force still standing in Burgoyne’s way on Bemis Heights. The letter
containing the offer was written by Clinton on September 12 promised to attempt to move up the
Hudson River on about September 22. Burgoyne sat in his headquarters at Sword’s Farm,
desperately awaiting word that Clinton had indeed moved out.
In the American camp, Benedict Arnold had been removed from command, and when he
requested to be posted back to Washington’s army in New Jersey, Gates agreed. Yet, before
Arnold would leave, he reconsidered his options. Clearly, as many of the senior officers agreed,
Arnold had performed valiantly at the battle of September 19, yet didn’t feel Gates had
acknowledged his actions to Congress. Being a vain individual, Arnold appreciated that at least
his fellow officers appreciated his actions, even if Gates didn’t. He also slowly came to the
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realization that any future battle to stop Burgoyne would likely happen here, near Bemis Heights.
If he could attain his much-desired glory in an upcoming battle, he would have even more reason
to request the restoration of his rank seniority that Congress had passed him over for. Gates,
although wanting to get rid of Arnold, may have begun to realize that he just may need the
aggressive field commander.
Burgoyne replied to Clinton’s September 12 letter by urging Sir Clinton to move up the
Hudson, and Burgoyne privately hoped the sooner the better. Clinton didn’t really have many
troops to spare, but when he heard that Howe had won a victory over Washington at Brandywine
on September 11, Clinton felt a little more flexibility to act. Clinton informed Howe that in a
week he would “probably make an attempt upon Fort Montgomery…(and) I shall have the
satisfaction to think that I have at least attempted something in favour of Genl Burgoyne’s
army.”261 The forts in the Highlands were commanded by American Major General Israel
Putnam, with a force of about 1,200. They represented a key part of the defense of the Hudson
River Valley, especially after the fall of Fort Washington in northern Manhattan in November of
1776. Clinton felt it might be a challenging mission. Besides, Clinton knew that the forts
themselves were “relatively small, only partly finished, and inadequately manned.”262 Clinton
prepared to set out for the expedition toward the end of the month.
Meanwhile, Burgoyne waited. Daily, more militia threaded into the American camp from
New York and New England. As it was heading toward the end of September, Burgoyne began
to worry about the onset of cold weather. Furthermore, the bit of food he still had was dwindling
fast. He was waiting for positive news that Clinton had moved out, while he considered whether
he could push on to Albany or retreat back to Canada. The clock was ticking. Just as the
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Americans were receiving militia daily, Burgoyne was beginning to suffer from a rash of
desertions, undoubtedly as the rank and file in his army began to realize their predicament.
Even though no attacks were forthcoming between Gates and Burgoyne’s forces, the two
forces continued to take shots at each other across the lines. British officer Thomas Anburey in
his journal describes the withering shots between the camps: “our present situation is far from
being an inactive one, the armies being so near, that not a night passes but there is firing, and
continual attacks upon the advanced pickets, especially those of the Germans.”263 While this was
happening daily, both sides continued to improve upon their defensive works, by felling trees
and building earthworks. Burgoyne had his men construct three defensive redoubts, the largest
being known as the Great Redoubt, which was to be the point of last resort that the army would
fall back toward if needed. Tensions began rising in Burgoyne’s force as well, as many soldiers
could not understand why the army hadn’t begun retreating yet. Even Baron Riedesel, German
commander of Burgoyne’s left-wing advocating moving back toward Fort Edward, but Burgoyne
still had his eye on Albany, and seemed to believe he could still break through. Yet, as supplies
dwindled, on October 3 Burgoyne was forced to cut the army’s food ration by a third. It was
getting desperate. Burgoyne wondered how much longer he could wait. He began to consider a
breakout.
On October 5, called a meeting of his senior commanders, and decided to move forward
with another attack on the America lines to try to find some weakness that they could slip
through. Burgoyne placed the date for the attack as October 7. What he may not have realized at
this point, was that, by now, Gates force on Bemis Heights now amounted to close to “11,000
Continentals and militia.”264
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On October 3, Clinton had left New York with about 3,000 troops, and on October 6
landed a force on the west side of the Hudson to commence the assault upon Fort Montgomery.
In command at the fort was American George Clinton. Upon hearing of the approach of the
British landing force, he dispatched a small force to attempt to slow them down. This force was
brushed aside as the British approached the forts, and at 5:00 pm demanded Fort Montgomery’s
surrender. When this was refused, both forts were stormed in a massive bayonet charge, and
were quickly captured. According to Weddle, “many American defenders escaped, including
George Clinton and his brother James, who commanded Fort Clinton, but 70 were killed, 40
wounded, and 240 captured.”265 British losses were 40 killed and 150 wounded. The Americans
retreated north, yet by “October 8, when the chain and boom obstacle was broken, the Hudson
Highlands lay open at Sir Henry Clinton’s feet.”266 Sir Clinton sent messengers to Burgoyne
informing him of the capture of the fortifications, yet all of them were captured by the
Americans before they even reached Albany.
On the morning of October 7, Burgoyne himself led a “reconnaissance in force” of about
1,700 toward the American lines. The Americans observed the movement. Daniel Morgan had
already been out in the morning with his riflemen scouting the British lines. When Gates was
informed of Burgoyne’s movement, he ordered Wilkinson to inform “Morgan to begin the
game.”267 Again, Burgoyne had organized his force in three columns, with his remaining Indians
and loyalists scouting ahead. Fraser and Balcarres commanded the right, while Riedesel took the
center. Back in the American camp, when Arnold, who was still with the Northern Army but
removed from command, heard the gunfire that the advance pickets were exchanging. He begged
Gates to let him go out and see what was happening, and Gates reluctantly agreed, as long as
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Benjamin Lincoln joined him. Arnold and Lincoln went to investigate, only to return to Gates to
inform him that a force of about 1,500 was approaching the American left. Gates immediately
dispatched Morgan and Dearborn to the area. Both Lincoln and Arnold suggested to Gates that
Morgan and Dearborn’s force must be supported, and Gates then issued orders for three more
regiments to join them.

Burgoyne was attempting to get around the American left flank.

According to the plan, once an opening was found in the American left, “General Simon Fraser
would push rapidly through in order to secure the upper portion of Bemis Heights.”268 Once this
area was secure, Burgoyne would move all of his available and non-committed troops to that
point, to consolidate and secure the breakthrough. To keep the Americans in place, Burgoyne
planned to feint attacks against the American river fortifications to their right, but the main thrust
of the attack would be to the left. What Burgoyne did not know, was that in the interlude after
the September 19 battle, Gates had extended his defensive line to his left, and at this point the
entire heights were fortified and staffed with militia.
Fraser was determined to find a weak spot in the line, but wherever he looked there were
more militia. Gates, for his part, was reluctant to commit a massive force, as being the defensive
commander, he did not want to weaken his fortified position. He dispatched Poor and Learned’s
brigades to assist Morgan and Dearborn, and a fierce contest erupted on the left. The Americans
surged forward. Around three, the entire left flank of Burgoyne’s reconnaissance force began
collapsing. Just as this was happening Morgan and Dearborn’s force continued their assault
against the right. The British began to fall back. Amidst “showers of American bullets buzzing
by - musket balls pierced Burgoyne’s clothing in several places and his horse was hit, but the
general himself was miraculously unscathed.”269 Burgoyne ordered his senior commanders to
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return to their fortifications, but in the chaos, they never received the order. Right around the
four, suddenly Benedict Arnold appeared on the battlefield on horseback, from seemingly out of
nowhere. He was not going to miss this battle. And he may have been drunk. He proceeded to
take command of a group of militias and rallied them. Arnold rode all over the battlefield,
rallying the Americans to fight on. Gates, upon hearing that Arnold was involved in the combat,
ordered for him to return to camp, yet “Arnold was motivating troops at a critical moment, and
he was playing a vital role in repulsing the British attack.”270 At about the same time, Burgoyne’s
talented commander of his Advanced Corps., Simon Fraser, was gunned down by an American
sharpshooter. Burgoyne considered Fraser his best commander, and with the fall of Fraser “he
ordered General Phillips and von Riedesel to retreat. Burgoyne knew that it was over.”271 As the
Americans surged forward, the British began retreating to the redoubts. Breymann, in the redoubt
that bore his name, had about 200 soldiers to defend the redoubt. Here again was Arnold, rushing
toward the redoubt along with the rest of the Americans. In a short time, Breymann’s redoubt
was surrounded. The Americans continued to fire into the redoubt until it’s defenders could take
no more. General Arnold then attempted to enter the redoubt from the back and just at that
moment he was struck. The bullet hit his horse, and as the animal collapsed, he crushed Arnold’s
leg underneath. With this injury, Arnold was bedridden for months following. All the German
defenders in Breymann’s redoubt were killed or captured. The Battle of Bemis Heights was now
over.
Burgoyne’s attempt to secure a breakout was a disaster. According to Michael Logusz,
the Battle of Bemis Heights cost Burgoyne “no less than 600 British and German soldiers had
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been killed, wounded or captured. Of these, approximately 250 went into captivity.”272 The next
day, Burgoyne’s force began to withdraw to the north.
Over the next two days, Burgoyne moved towards Saratoga, slowed by heavy rain and
constant harassment from Americans scouts. John Stark, the hero of Bennington had moved
north to Fort Edward to cut-off Burgoyne’s retreat and prevent any possibility of the British
force reaching Canada. Slowly, the noose was tightening around Burgoyne’s army. This time
there would be no escape. By now, most of Burgoyne’s supplies had reached exhaustion. His
army was starving. On his tail was Gates and the 14,000 Continentals and militia he had with
him.
Burgoyne was still unsure what happened to the force Sir Henry Clinton had sent north.
He decided to hold out for more time, but the end was inevitable. He finally asked General Gates
for terms, and Gates agreed to signing a “convention” with Burgoyne instead of a full surrender.
The terms included the British army under Burgoyne to be afforded the full honors of war, and
his army would be disarmed and marched to Boston, where they would be shipped back to
England with the express caveat of never serving on the North American continent for the
duration of the conflict. Once this agreement was made, on October 17, 1777, British General
John Burgoyne surrendered to American General Horatio Gates. This marked the first time in the
history of the British Empire that an entire British field army surrendered.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the Continental Congress learned of the terms that gates
had agreed to, they rejected the convention under which Burgoyne surrendered his force. The
majority of Burgoyne’s field army was not returned to England and were marched around to
various camps around the colonies until the signing of the peace treaty to end the war in 1783.
Furthermore, France’s reaction to the defeat of Burgoyne convinced them that the American
272
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colonist could win the war against Great Britain and began to aid the Americans in more
substantial ways than they had to this point. France's naval and military assistance contributed
directly to the Americans winning their independence.
As we can see, Burgoyne’s “Grand Strategy” was flawed from its inception, because stiff
resistance to the British advances by Patriot forces and militias, aided by local communities, was
completely underestimated. This flaw was exacerbated by the forbidding terrain of upstate New
York, as well as a complete failure of coordination between Burgoyne’s advance from the north,
Colonel Barry St. Leger’s advance from the west, and General William Howe’s forces positioned
to the south in New York City.
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